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Policy Summary

At a time of growing consensus that conventional policy approaches to pover
ty via the welfare system are ineffective, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC)
has gained increased political support and funding. Virtually all legislative pro
grams that address the problems of poverty and welfare dependency, the authors
note, now include an expanded role for EIC.
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a transfer program that operates through
the income tax system to provide an income grant (technically a refundable
tax credit) to low- and moderate-income working families with children. It
is unique among transfer programs in that it provides its maximum credit to
families with some designated positive level of earned income, but provides
no benefits at all to families with no earned income. Unlike the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program, married couples are eligible for the same
EIC benefits as single-parent families with the same income. In contrast to
the minimum wage, the EIC is well-targetted, since it is based on a household's
total annual income rather than on an individual's hourly wage. The EIC is
a public policy of growing importance which is supported virtually across the
political spectrum, since it is consistent with the basic principles of both a liberal
and a conservative antipoverty strategy.
With the increasing concern over the well-being of the working poor in re
cent years, numerous proposals to expand the EIC program have been
developed. In the 101st Congress, separate Senate and House bills are being
considered in a House-Senate Conference Committee. The main contribution
of this study is its analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the current pro
gram and also of the likely effects of adjustments to the EIC. The authors
describe the Earned Income Tax Credit as "a policy whose time on the na
tional agenda has clearly come."
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Introduction

The decade of the 1980s was a difficult time for policy makers con
cerned with the problems of poverty. The decade began with a reces
sion that pushed the poverty rate in 1982 and 1983 to its highest level
in almost 20 years. Despite the improvement in the economy since then,
the poverty rate at the end of the decade was still higher than at any
time during the 1970s. The 1980s also saw declining poverty rates for
the elderly coincide with rising poverty rates for children. In 1987, for
example, one child in five lived in poverty, and for children under age
six it was almost one in four. Attention was also focused on the
"underclass" (Wilson 1987), a group composed of families in concen
trated poverty areas and beset with behavioral problems that allegedly
left them unable to join in mainstream economic life.
Politically, the decade saw efforts to re-evaluate the success of the
"welfare state" and to scale back the "safety net." There was also
a growing consensus that conventional policy approaches to the pover
ty population via the welfare system were ineffective, or even counter
productive. Charles Murray (1984) first advanced this argument in Los
ing Ground, but it was subsequently endorsed in some respects by the
Family Support Act with its emphasis on work requirements and job
training.
One income transfer program that has managed not only to escape
criticism but, indeed, has gained increased political support and fund
ing is the Earned Income Tax Credit or EIC. What began as a small
program in 1975 with the modest intent of offsetting Social Security
payroll taxes for low-income workers with children has now become
a rallying point in redirecting poverty policy. Indeed, the EIC now often
seems to be the policy of choice for a wide range of problems ranging
from the minimum wage ("increase the EIC instead") to child care
("adjust the EIC for family size"). Both liberals and conservatives,
Democrats and Republicans, have offered legislation involving EIC ad
justments and extensions.
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What is the EIC and why is it suddenly so popular? Simply put, the
EIC is an income-transfer program that operates through the tax system
to provide an income grant (technically, a refundable tax credit) to lowincome working households with children. In 1990, it provided a max
imum of $953 and an average of over $550 to roughly 10 million
families.
The popularity of the EIC program derives from its unique design
that clearly distinguishes it from conventional welfare programs. Unlike
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program which
provides maximum benefits to families who do not work, EIC provides
its maximum credit to families with some designated positive level of
earned income; in 1990 the maximum benefit, $953, was obtained by
households with earnings between $6,810 and $10,734. Families with
no earned income receive no benefits at all under EIC. Also unlike
AFDC, married couples are eligible for the same benefits as singleparent families with the same income. Thus, EIC can be thought of
as endorsing and financially supporting both work and marriage. The
same cannot be said of AFDC.
As a way to supplement the income of low-wage workers, EIC also
fares well in comparison with an increase in the minimum wage. The
minimum wage is a poorly targeted program, raising wages not only
for low-wage heads of household but also for many low-wage workers
primarily teenagers in middle- and high-income families. Moreover,
the minimum wage will generate involuntary unemployment whenever
the legal minimum exceeds the market wage. The burden of involun
tary unemployment falls heavily on low-earning households and poor
teenagers.
In contrast, the EIC is well-targeted, since it is based on a household's
total annual income, rather than an individual's hourly wage. Moreover,
only families with children are eligible. In addition, the EIC does not
generate involuntary unemployment. It may raise or lower labor sup
ply, as we will explain in chapter 3, but at the wage that results, labor
demand equals labor supply, in sharp contrast to the excess supply of
labor generated by a minimum wage.
Finally, a modified EIC can be a vehicle for addressing the issue of
child care. A modified EIC would adjust the benefits it provides to the
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size of the family and/or the age of children. Although the 1990 EIC
does not adjust benefits in this way, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives approved legislation in the 101st Congress that would
include such a provision.
The EIC currently enjoys broad support across the political spectrum
because it is consistent with the basic principles of both a "liberal"
and a "conservative" antipoverty strategy. Let's consider the role of
the EIC in each strategy.
The liberal envisions the EIC as a supplement to, not a replacement
for, welfare. The working poor are not necessarily more worthy or de
serving than the nonworking poor, but they need help and are ill-treated
by AFDC, so an EIC is a useful policy. The financing of EIC should
not come at the expense of welfare. Most liberals see the EIC as a com
plement to, not a substitute for, a relatively high minimum wage.
Although some liberals recognize that a high minimum wage will reduce
the number of jobs employers offer low-skilled persons, many morally
object to very low wages and are impressed with the fact that the ma
jority of low-skilled workers remain employed under a high minimum
wage.
Where does the EIC fit into the larger liberal strategy? Liberals might
prefer a single transfer system that targets all individuals in need
regardless of work status. Also, liberals (unless they are economists)
generally support a high minimum wage. But the liberal recognizes that
conservative citizens who are unwilling to support welfare or a high
minimum wage may be willing to support the EIC. Thus, it seems sen
sible to try to obtain as much conservative support as possible for the
EIC, while at the same time resisting cuts in welfare and pressing for
a higher minimum wage.
Conservatives, on the other hand, envision the EIC as a replacement
for welfare for nonelderly, able-bodied people. They believe that the
working poor are generally more worthy and deserving than the nonworking, nonelderly, able-bodied poor, and that government assistance
should be targeted on them rather than those who do not work. The
financing of EIC, according to conservatives, should come at the ex
pense of welfare.
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The EIC should substitute for raising the minimum wage. Permit
ting employers to offer jobs at low wages will result in more jobs being
offered and reduce unemployment for low-skilled persons willing to
work. Even if a person begins in a low-wage job, the EIC supplement
will compensate for the low wage, and responsible work effort should
enable the individual to earn wage increases and promotions.
Some conservatives support varying the EIC with the number of
children as an alternative to child-care programs that directly subsidize
providers of child care. Other conservatives oppose varying the EIC
with the number of children (as well as alternative child-care programs)
because they do not want to encourage poor people to have large families.
To limit the total cost of EIC, most conservatives would probably sup
port exclusion of the childless working poor.
Thus, although liberal and conservative strategies often conflict, the
EIC appears to have an important role to play in each strategy.
In this monograph, we take a close and careful look at the EIC pro
gram. We look at its strengths and its weaknesses, its current effects,
and also the likely effects of adjustments in the EIC program. We com
pare it to alternative policies intended to provide financial assistance
to low income families.
As is, perhaps, inevitable in writing about important public policy
issues, the policies themselves change even as one tries to analyze them.
This is especially true for a policy like the Earned Income Tax Credit,
whose time in the national agenda has clearly come.
When we began this research, expansion of the EIC had been con
sidered in the 100th Congress, but no action was taken. As we worked
(in 1989), the House Ways and Means Committee approved a substan
tial expansion of the EIC program as part of a new legislative initiative
on child care. That bill, which included an increase in EIC benefits and
an adjustment of benefits for family size, did not, however, reach the
floor of the House during that legislative session. * At about the same
time, the Senate passed its own child care bill, the Act for Better Child
Care Services. The Senate version included a much more modest ex
pansion of the EIC program, limited to families with children under
age four. Finally, after we finished this monograph and just as this
volume went to press (in the spring of 1990), the full House of Represen-
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tatives approved the EIC provisions of the original Ways and Means
Committee day-care bill as part of the Early Childhood Education and
Development Act.
As we write this, the future of the EIC program is uncertain. There
will undoubtedly be changes, but the extent of those changes is still
hard to predict. The House and Senate versions differ quite signficantly in terms of EIC expansion, and a conference committee must,
therefore, reconcile those differences. The House version is more than
twice as expensive as the Senate version, and some compromise on the
EIC expansion is a genuine possibility. And even then, a presidential
veto is a distinct possibility, especially if the version reported out of
conference retains many of the features of the House bill. Child-care
legislation, supported by President Bush but never passed by either the
House or the Senate, was similar to, but yet more modest than, the Senate
version with respect to its EIC provisions.
Our approach in this monograph has been dictated, in part, by these
developments. Where possible, we have tried to emphasize general prin
ciples and effects that are common to any and all EIC programs. No
matter what happens to the EIC program in the Congress this session
or in the future, these ideas will be valid, and, we hope, useful as well.
Where we have needed to turn to specifics to explain, for example,
exactly how the EIC program works we have used the law as it stood
in 1990. Where we have tried to describe who benefits from the EIC,
how much in benefits different groups receive, and what effects the EIC
might have on the economy, we have used the EIC law as it stood it
1988. Our reasons for doing this are explained in chapter 2. Fortunate
ly, the EIC law in 1988 and the EIC law in 1990 are identical in all
important respects. Finally, where we considered expansion and reform
of the EIC program, we included among our alternatives a specifica
tion that is very similar to the legislation passed by the House of
Representatives.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the EIC: how the EIC works and
what it does. Chapter 2 uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data to estimate the distribution of EIC benefits in 1988 among the
population and to describe some of the characteristics of the popula
tion of EIC recipients. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of EIC on labor
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supply decisions. Chapter 4 compares the EIC to other antipoverty
policies, including a negative income tax (NIT), welfare (AFDC), an
increase in the minimum wage, and a wage-subsidy plan. Chapter 5
uses the PSID data to estimate the likely impact of a number of expan
sions and adjustments of the EIC program. Finally, chapter 6 considers
how to increase the EIC participation rate.
NOTE
1. The bill was dropped after a split emerged among the chief sponsors over whether funding
should emphasize direct grants to states or a combination of grants and tax credits (EIC) and whether
church-related child care centers should be eligible for the provisions of the bill.

1
An Overview
of the
Earned Income Tax Credit

The Earned Income Tax Credit (ETC) provides assistance through the
tax system to low-earning households with children. To benefit from
the EIC, a household must have at least one dependent child, positive
labor earnings, and total income less than a specified ceiling. Thus, the
EIC helps working parents with modest incomes.
The EIC is a tax credit on the federal personal income tax. Like any
tax credit, it enables an eligible household to reduce the tax it would
otherwise pay. For example, if a household's tax would have been $550,
but its EIC tax credit is $300, then the household must only pay $250
in tax.
Significantly, the EIC is a refundable tax credit. This means that if
the tax credit exceeds the tax the household would otherwise owe (the
tax-before-credit), then the government pays the household the difference.
For example, if a household's tax-before-credit is $250, but its EIC tax
credit is $550, then the government will pay the household $300.
A significant feature of the EIC is that it is based on the household,
not the individual. The household's total income determines the
household's EIC credit.
History of the EIC
The Earned Income Tax Credit, which emerged in the late 1980s as
an important antipoverty policy, began quietly and modestly in 1975 so
quietly that for many years it was virtually unnoticed by the general
public, in sharp contrast to welfare (AFDC) and the minimum wage.
Even many antipoverty strategists have only recently begun to emphasize
the EIC.
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Why was the EIC enacted? One rationale was simply to offset the Social
Security payroll tax for low-income households with children. Prior to
1975, a chronic complaint against the Social Security payroll tax had
been its regressivity. The payroll tax was proportional to wages up to
a ceiling. Unlike the income tax, which included personal exemptions
and a standard deduction, the payroll tax began with the first $100 of
earnings.
But if the payroll tax was viewed as the problem, why not exempt
the first few thousand dollars of wage income from payroll tax? Evidently,
it was thought that this would complicate the employer's task of implemen
ting the payroll tax for Social Security. Also, it might weaken the political
claim of these workers to Social Security benefits upon retirement. So
Congress decided to leave the payroll tax alone, but return the money
to low-income households through a credit on the personal income tax.
Of course, some antipoverty strategists saw a more ambitious pur
pose for the EIC: to reward work effort and supplement the earnings
of low-income households with children. Here was a policy aimed at
a clientele with which many citizens sympathized: working families, in
cluding married-couple families, with modest incomes, who were often
excluded from other income-transfer programs. This broader purpose
yielded an important corollary: the amount of EIC supplement might
exceed the amount of Social Security payroll tax. The citizenry might
decide to more than compensate working parents for their payroll tax
burden.
The magnitude of the EIC credit has been raised periodically since
it was enacted. The maximum credit was $400 from 1976-1978, $500
from 1979-1984, $550 in 1985-1986, and has been raised each year since
then. In 1990 the maximum credit was $953.
In the 101st Congress (1989-1990) both the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed child-care legislation that involved a substantial
expansion of the EIC program. While the specific form of the new EIC
program is still uncertain (as of April 1990), it is very likely that the
basic credit will be increased and will be adjusted for the number and/or
age of the children in a family. The changes will probably be effective
in 1991.
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Mechanics of the EIC
In this section, we focus on the mechanics of how the EIC works and
on its interaction with the federal income tax system. To illustrate this,
we use the actual numerical parameters of the EIC program and the tax
system as of 1990. Although the EIC program will probably be somewhat
different in 1991 and beyond, its basic structure the features that set
EIC apart from other transfer programs will not change. Thus, our
exposition of the EIC in 1990 will apply, with only minor modifica
tions, to the EIC program in the near future.
To simplify our exposition, we first consider a household whose in
come consists solely of labor earnings. In the following section, we ex
amine how the EIC program works when a household also has nonlabor
income.
There are two distinguishing features of an EIC that can be quickly
grasped in figure 1.1. First, if a household has no earnings (E=0), it
receives no credit (C=0), so the EIC is clearly restricted to households
with labor earnings. Second, the EIC begins with a phase-in range where
the credit rises as the household's labor earnings rise, and ends with
a phase-out range where the credit fells as earnings continue to rise.
Figure 1.1
EIC Schedule
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Under an EIC, the government must designate the level of earnings,
Em, at which the phase-in range ends and the credit reaches its max
imum, Cm. Then, the credit must be gradually phased-out as earnings
rise. The phase-out, however, need not begin immediately. As shown
in figure 1.1, the EIC phase-out can be delayed by having a stationary
range where the credit remains constant at Cm as the household's earn
ings increase. But at some earnings level Eb , the phase-out must begin,
so that the credit declines with the further rise in the household's earn
ings until at some level of earnings Ee , the phase-out ends as the credit
reaches zero.
Figure 1.2 shows the actual EIC schedule for 1990. If the household's
earnings are zero, its credit is zero. When the household earns its first
$100, it receives a credit of $14; it continues to receive $14 for each ad
ditional $100 of earnings until E reaches $6,810 and the credit reaches
$953 (14 percent of $6,810). There is a stationary range from $6,810 to
$10,734 where the credit remains $953. The phase-out begins at $10,734.
The phase-out rate is 10 percent; for each additional $100 of earnings,
the credit is reduced by $10. Since the maximum credit is $953, it takes
$9,530 of additional earnings to completely phase-out the credit. This
occurs at Ee =$20,264 ($10,734-t-$9,530=$20,264).
~

Figure 1.2
EIC Schedule 1990

$953

$6,810

$10,734

$20,264
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Under the 1990 EIC schedule, the credit C for a household with labor
earnings E (equal to adjusted gross income AGI) is given by: 1
C=.14E
C=953
C=953-.1(E-10,734)
C=0

ifE<6,810,
if 6,810 <E< 10,734,
if 10,734 <E< 20,264,
if E> 20,264.

The level of earnings at which the phase-out ends, Ee, is obtained
by setting C=0 in the third equation and solving for E:
0=953-.1(E-10,734), so Ee =20,264.
Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the phase-in and phase-out thresholds
(Em and Ej,) are automatically adjusted each year for inflation.
In the phase-out range, for every additional $100 of earnings, the EIC
credit is reduced $10, so the household's net gain (after earning an addi
tional $100) is only $90. This is the same situation that an ordinary tax
payer would face if she were in a 10 percent tax bracket. Thus, it is as
though the EIC recipient in the phase-out range faces a marginal tax
rate (MTR) of 10 percent.
In the phase-in range, by contrast, the EIC recipient faces a negative
marginal tax rate equal to -14 percent, because for every $100 of earn
ings, the individual gains $114. Thus, the current EIC is characterized
by three marginal tax rates: -14 percent in the phase-in range, zero per
cent in the stationary range, and +10 percent in the phase-out range.
Note that the MTR has the same magnitude as the phase-in or phaseout rate.
The EIC, however, is not the only determinant of a household's
marginal tax rate. When a household's earnings reach a threshold, the
household enters the positive tax system. It is the interaction of the EIC
and the positive tax system that determines the household's marginal
tax rate, and whether the household receives a net payment from the
government (because its EIC credit exceeds its tax-before-credit), or must
make a net payment to the government (because its EIC credit is less
than its tax-before-credit).
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The interaction of the EIC and the tax system is shown in figure 1.3
for a family of four. In 1990, with the personal exemption equal to $2,050
and the standard deduction equal to $5,450, this family enters the positive
tax system when its adjusted gross income reaches $13,650 ((4 x $2,050)
-I-$5,450=$13,650). It is then subject to a 15 percent tax rate on earn
ings above $13,650. When its earnings equal $16,296, its tax (before EIC
credit) is $397, but its EIC credit is also $397, so $16,296 is the "break
even" earnings Ev .2 The EIC schedule and the positive tax schedule
overlap from $13,650 to $20,264.
Figure 1.3
EIC and Tax Schedules 1990
CT

$953

$397

$6,810

$10,734 $13,650 $16,296

$20,264

The range where the EIC phase-out overlaps with the positive tax
system (E=$13,650 to E=$20,264) is especially significant. We know
that the EIC phase-out alone imposes a marginal tax rate equal to the
phase-out rate 10 percent because for each additional $100 of earn
ings, the credit is reduced $10 so the net gain is only $90. The positive
tax schedule alone imposes an MTR equal to the tax rate 15 percent
because for each additional $100 of earnings, the tax is $15 so the net
gain is only $85. Together, the EIC and positive tax system impose an
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MTR equal to 25 percent (10 percent+15 percent), the sum of the phaseout rate and the tax rate. For each additional $100 of earnings, the credit
is reduced $10 and the tax is $15 so the net gain is only $75. Thus, in
the range where the EIC and the positive tax schedule overlap, the max
imum MTR occurs, and this maximum MTR equals the sum of the EIC
phase-out rate and the tax rate.
As shown in figure 1.4, when earnings are between zero and $20,264,
a family of four faces five different marginal tax rates due to the in
teraction of EIC and the positive tax system: -14 percent, 0 percent,
10 percent, 25 percent (the sum of the EIC phase-out rate of 10 percent
and the tax rate of 15 percent), and 15 percent.
Figure 1.4
Marginal Tax Rates
25%

MTR
MTR

15%

$6,810

$10,734

$13,650

$20,264

-14%

Figure 1.5 shows how household net income I (defined as its earnings
E plus its EIC credit C minus its tax T) varies with its earnings E for
a family of four that takes the standard deduction. The 45 degree line
with a slope of 1.00 is drawn to enable a visual comparison of I and
E. If the I schedule is above the 45 degree line, then I exceeds E. This
is true until E reaches $16,296, the break-even earnings Ev, where the
I schedule intersects the 45 degree line.
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Figure 1.5
Income vs. Earnings

$16,296

$7,763

$6,810

$10,734

$13,650 $16,296

$20,264

The slope of the I schedule equals (1-MTR); for example, in the range
where the EIC phase-out overlaps with the positive tax schedule
(E=$13,650 to E=$20,264), the slope is (l-.25)=.75, because each ad
ditional $100 of earnings results in a net gain of $75. Thus, the slope
of the I schedule takes on five different values from zero to $20,264,
corresponding to the five different marginal tax rates: 1.14, 1.00, .90,
.75, and .85.
The EIC and Adjusted Gross Income
We now consider a complication. In fact, the EIC phase-in depends
on a household's labor income, but the EIC phase-out depends on either
the household's adjusted gross income or its labor income.
Adjusted gross income (AGI), as defined by the U.S. tax code, equals
labor income plus capital income (property income such as interest,
dividends, capital gains, or rental income) plus several items (such as
unemployment compensation) minus several items (such as an individual
retirement account deduction). Although a household's AGI is usually
larger than its labor income, it is possible for it to be smaller due to
the items that are subtracted in computing AGI.
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Suppose a household has $6,810 of income in 1990. If the income
is all from labor, the household obtains the maximum EIC credit, $953.
If, however, the income is all from capital, the household obtains no
EIC credit. Suppose instead that a household has $20,264 of income.
It obtains no EIC credit, regardless of the source of the income. Thus,
if the household has $6,810 of labor income, and $13,454 of capital
income, it obtains no EIC credit, even though it would have obtained
the maximum EIC credit, $953, if it had no capital income. Thus, an
increase in capital income phases out the EIC credit just as does an in
crease in labor income.
The reason for the phase-in by labor earnings and phase-out by ad
justed gross income or labor earnings should be evident. One purpose
of the EIC is to encourage work and reward work effort. The phase-in
must therefore be based on labor earnings. However, another purpose
of the EIC is to assist households in financial need. The phase-out should
therefore be triggered by either adjusted gross income or labor earnings.
Thus, the 1990 EIC schedule is given by:
If AGI < 10,734:
C = .14E
C=953
C=953-.1(E-10,734)
C=0

ifE<6,810,
if 6,810<E< 10,734,
if 10,734 <E<20,264,
if E> 20,264.

If AGI > 10,734:
C=Min[C(E),C(A)], the smaller of C(E) and C(A), where C(E)
is the credit given by the above formula for C, and C(A) is the
credit given by that formula when AGI replaces E. 3
The distinction between labor earnings and adjusted gross income
justifies the overlapping of the EIC range and the positive tax range.
We can explain this point by recalling our earlier example of a family
of four, shown in figure 1.3.
When its earnings exceed $13,650, the family enters the positive tax
system. Between E=$13,650 and E=$20,264, the family has both a
tax-before-credit T and an EIC credit C. When E is less than $16,296,
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C is greater than T, so the IRS makes a net payment to the family; con
versely, when E is greater than $16,296, C is less than T, so the family
makes a net payment to the IRS. When E equals $16,296, C equals
T, so no net payment is made; we call $16,296 the break-even level
of earnings.
It might be asked: Why not net out T and C in the first place? Clear
ly, E=$16,296 is the key level of earnings for a family of four. If E
is less than $16,296, the family receives a net payment from the IRS;
if E is greater than $16,296, the family makes a net payment to the
IRS. We can compute the net credit for any E below $16,296, and the
net tax for any E above $16,296. Why not present the household with
a net EIC schedule for E less than $16,296, and a net tax schedule for
E greater than $16,296? Then the household would either receive a re
fundable EIC credit, or pay a tax, but not both. Moreover, it would
then be clear that E=$16,296 divides the population between net recip
ients and net payers.4
If the only kind of income were labor earnings, this netting out would
make sense. But now consider two households. Household L earns
only labor income while household K earns only capital income. Citizens
may feel differently about the two kinds of income. For example, citizens
may want household K to begin making a net payment to the IRS when
its capital income exceeds $13,650, while they may want household
L to begin making a net payment to the IRS only when its labor income
exceeds $16,296. If so, then the overlapping of the EIC and tax schedules
implements this preference. For household K, the C schedule in figure
1.3 is irrelevant, so it begins making a net payment to the IRS when
its income exceeds $13,650.
The overlapping schedules imply that a household with only capital
income begins making a net payment to the IRS at a lower income level
than the household with only labor income. Citizens can specify two
income levels: the income at which they want household K to begin
making a net payment to the IRS ($13,650), and the income at which
they want household L to begin making a net payment to the IRS
($16,296). The overlapping of the schedules then implements this
preference.
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Provisions of the U.S. EIC
To be eligible for the current U.S. EIC, a household must be sup
porting at least one child. 5 Under provisions in effect in 1990, the first
child triggers the credit, but then the credit does not vary with the number
of children. Under the EIC expansion considered by the 1990 Congress,
beginning in 1991 the credit would vary with the number of children.
In chapter 5 we will analyze the impact of varying the credit with the
number of children.
On the bottom of the first page of the 1989 1040 tax return, the
household is alerted: "If this line [your adjusted gross income] is less
than $19,340 and a child lived with you, see 'Earned Income Credit.' "
What happens if the household neglects this warning, even though it
is eligible for the EIC? The IRS is instructed to check each return to
determine whether the household is entitled to credit. If it is, the IRS
is instructed to calculate the credit for the household, and either reduce
its tax liability or pay the household the correct amount. As long as
the household files a return, it should get any EIC credit to which it
is entitled.
Of course, the IRS can only help a household that files a tax return.
Currently, households with very low incomes are not legally required
to file (for example, a gross income of $13,650 in 1990 for a married
couple with two children), so there are undoubtedly households that
do not receive the credit to which they are entitled. In chapter 6, we
offer a proposal to address this shortcoming of the current EIC.
In theory, the household need not wait until its 1040 return is pro
cessed to receive its credit. Under the advance payment option, the credit
can be received with each paycheck. In practice, however, only a small
fraction of households receive credit through the advance payment op
tion. In chapter 6, we assess the advance payment option.
The current 1040 return is virtually certain to confuse a household
about how the EIC works. A clear return would first have the taxpayer
calculate tax liability before credits, then let the taxpayer subtract all
credits including the EIC to obtain tax owed. Tax owed would then
be compared with tax withheld to determine who must write a check:
the household or the government.
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But, surprisingly, the EIC is not included in the credits section where
it belongs. Instead, it is included later in Repayments section, where
the taxpayer is instructed to add the EIC credit to federal income tax
withheld. This instruction does yield the correct answer. But it makes
the EIC credit seem the same as tax withheld. In chapter 6, we suggest
how the 1040 return can be revised so that a taxpayer can easily grasp
the meaning of the EIC.

Table 1.1 shows the evolution for selected years since 1976 of the
EIC rates (phase-in rate pl and phase-out rate pj and thresholds (the
earnings Em at which maximum credit Cm is reached, the earnings Eb
at which the phase-out begins, and the earnings Ee at which the phaseout ends). The initial EIC was a simple symmetrical EIC with
pi =p0 =10 percent, no stationary range, Em =Eb =$4,000 and
Ee =$8,000. Not until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were the thresholds
adjusted automatically (indexed) for inflation.
In 1979 the stationary range made its debut, and the phase-out rate
p0 was made unequal to the phase-in rate p4. But note that the phaseout rate (12.5 percent) was greater than the phase-in rate (10 percent)
in 1979, while the phase-out rate since 1987 (10 percent) has been less
than the phase-in rate (14 percent).
Table 1.2 shows the total amount of EIC credit and the number of
families receiving credit. For 1990, it is projected that of the $5.9 billion
of EIC credits, $4.8 billion will be checks written by the government
to households, while $1.1 billion will reduce households' tax liability.
Thus, "reftmdability" is extremely important. In 1990, roughly 80 per
cent ($4.8 billion out of $5.9 billion) of the total EIC credit would be
eliminated if the EIC were not refundable. 7 Roughly 10.3 million families
will receive credit, and the average credit per family will be $567.
In 1986, the number of families obtaining advance payment was very
small, roughly 10,000 out of 6.3 million; the amount received was on
ly $2.2 million out of $2.0 billion. Over 560,000 returns that did not
claim credit were given credit after the IRS check of the return. Thus,
about 9 percent of households who received credit (560,000 out of

Table 1.1
Earned Income Credit Parameters, Selected Years
1976-1990
Year

Pi

Em

cm

Po

Eb

Ee

1976

10%

$4,000

$400

10.00%

$ 4,000

$ 8,000

1979

10

5,000

500

12.50

6,000

10,000

1985

11

5,000

550

12.22

6,500

11,000

1987

14

6,080

851

10.00

6,920

15,432

1988

14

6,240

874

10.00

9,840

18,576

1989

14

6,500

910

10.00

10,240

19,340

1990

14

6,810

953

10.00

10,730

20,264

SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means 1990, table 15, p. 834.
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Table 1.2
and Coverage, Selected Years
Amounts
Credit:
EIC
1976-1991

Overview

Year

Total amount
of credit
(millions)

Number of families
who received credit
(thousands)

Refunded portion
of credit
(millions)

Average credit
per family

1976

$1,295

6,473

$ 890

$200

1980

1,986

6,954

1,370

286

1984

1,638

5,759

1,162

284

1985

2,088

6,500

1,499

321

1986

2,009

6,277

1,479

320

1987

3,931

8,738

2,930

450

1988a

4,807

9,116

4,281

527

1989a

5,368

9,805

4,412

547

19903

5,858

10,333

4,759

567

1991a

6,310

10,633

5,113

593

SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means 1990, table 17, p. 837.
a. Projection.

a,
s
n
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6.3 million) failed to claim it on their returns. We do not have an estimate
of the number of households that are entitled to credit but do not receive
it because they do not file a tax return.
Table 1.3 shows how projected 1991 EIC benefits are distributed
across income classes. Households with income under $20,000 receive
roughly 85 percent of the total EIC credit of $6.3 billion.
Table 1.3
Projected Distribution of EIC, 1991
All returns
(thousands)

Amount of credit
(millions)

$0 to $10

1,953

$1,393

$10 to $20

5,679

4,000

$20 to $30

2,768

822

$30 to $40

185

74

$40 to $50

26

12

$50 to $75

13

5

$75 to $100

6

4

$100 to $200

0

0

$200 and over

0

0

10,633

6,310

Income class
(thousands)

Total

SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means 1990, table 19, p. 839.

Conclusion
The earned income tax credit (EIC) has moved from relative obscurity
when it began in the mid-1970s to center stage as the 1990s begin. After
more than a decade in the shadow of welfare and the minimum wage,
the EIC has emerged as the antipoverty policy that commands support
across the political spectrum. The key reason for this broad support
is its unique design. It helps an important segment of low-income
households those who work and earn.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
The Algebra of the Earned Income Tax Credit
We begin with the simpler case where adjusted gross income (AGI) equals
labor earnings (E). Then we consider the case where AGI differs from E. Final
ly, we consider the interaction of the credit with the income tax schedule.

AGI equals E
Em = earnings at which the phase-in range ends and the credit reaches its
maximum, Cm
Eb = earnings at which the phase-out begins
Ee = earnings at which the phase-out ends as the credit reaches zero
pj = phase-in rate
p0 = phase-out rate
The credit C for a household with labor earnings E is given by:
C = PiEifE<Em,
C = Cm = PiEm ifEm <E<Eb ,
C =Cm - Po(E-Eb)ifEb <E<Ee ,
C =OifE>Ee.
To obtain Ee, set C=Cm-p0(E-Eb)=0 and solve for E to obtain:
Ee = (Cm/Po)+Eb =(PiEm/p0)+Eb.
AGI Differs from E
Note that although AGI is usually greater than or equal to E, it is possible
for AGI to be smaller than E due to items that may be subtracted in computing
AGI.
If AGI<Eb:
C
C
C
C

= PiEifE<Em,
=Cm = PiEm ifEm <E<Eb ,
=Cm-Po(E-Eb)ifEb <E<Ee,
=OifE>Ee .

If AGI>Eb:
C = Min[C(E),C(A)], the smaller of C(E) and C(A), where C(E) is the
credit given by the above formula for C, and C(A) is the credit given
by that formula when AGI replaces E.
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Interaction with the Income Tax Schedule
The tax-before-credit T is given by T=t(E-Ex), where Ex is the earnings
exempt from tax due to the standard deduction and personal exemptions and
t is the tax rate. The break-even earnings Ev is the E at which the tax given
by T=t(E-Ex) equals the credit given by C=Cm-p0(E-Eb). Setting T=C, we
solve for E to obtain
Hv =(tEx +Cm + PoEb)/(t+ Po).
Income-after-tax-and-credit is I=E-T+C. In the range where the tax and credit
interact,
I
I

= E-t(E-Ex)+Cm-Po(E-Eb), so
= [l-(t+ Po)]E+tEx +Cm +p0Eb .

Note that dI/dE = [l-(t+p0)].
The implicit marginal tax rate (MTR) is defined by:
(!-MTR)=dI/dE. Since dI/dE=[l-(t+p0)], MTR=t+p0 .

NOTES
1. Although we have used a formula to describe the 1990 EIC schedule, the actual schedule con
sists of discrete brackets in a table on the 1040 personal income tax return. The formula approx
imates the numbers the taxpayer would actually obtain from the tax return table. The phase-out
in the 1990 table actually begins at $10,730 rather than $10,734. The number that fits the formula
exactly ($10,734 instead of $10,730) is presented here because it makes it easier to grasp how
the EIC is constructed. An appendix to this chapter presents the algebra of the earned income
tax credit.
2. We find Ev = 16,296 as follows. The tax T is T=.15(E - 13,650). The credit C is C=953 .1(E - 10,734). T equals C where .15(E - 13,650) =953 - .1(E - 10,734). Solving for E yields
Ey = 16,296. A formula for Ey is given in the appendix to this chapter.
3. A general treatment is given in the appendix to this chapter.
4. The break-even level of earnings would increase with family size due to the increase in per
sonal exemptions. But the point is still the same. It might still be asked: For each family size,
why not divide the population at the break-even level of earnings for that family size, so that
the household would either receive an EIC credit, or pay a tax, but not both?
5. The following are eligible for the EIC: married individuals filing a joint return who are entitl
ed to a dependency exemption for a child; surviving spouses with a dependent child; and unmar
ried heads of households with a child. The household is judged to be supporting the child only
if it finances more than half the expenses. If more than half of the household's income is from
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDQ, then the household is not eligible for the EIC.
6. The material in this section draws heavily from the Committee on Ways and Means (1990).
7. The refunded portion of the credit is the portion that exceeds tax liability; it is treated as a
budget outlay. The rest of the credit is classified as a tax expenditure. Thus, in recent years the
budget outlay has greatly exceeded the tax expenditure for EIC.

2
A Profile
of the
EIC Population
In this chapter, we take a detailed look at the EIC recipient popula
tion in 1988. The only direct information on EIC receipt comes from
published IRS tabulations on the total number of families receiving a
credit, on the distribution of families across income classes, and on the
average amount of credit received. But very little is known about who
it is that receives EIC benefits or about how the amount of the credit
varies across different groups. What fraction of working poor families
receive EIC benefits? What fraction of EIC families are married couples
who may receive few other benefits? What fraction of EIC families are
poor? What are the average work hours and wages of workers in families
receiving EIC benefits? Those are the questions we examine in this
chapter.
We focus on the EIC program and the EIC population in 1988 because
that was the most recent year with known EIC parameters at the time
this research was conducted in mid-1989. Fortunately, the major features
of the EIC program have been unchanged since 1988; the only difference
is that the various income cutoff points have been adjusted annually
for inflation. 1 As a result, the EIC recipient population in 1988 was
probably very similar to the EIC population in 1990 and our findings
for 1988 would almost certainly apply to 1990 as well.
We find that approximately one-third of all poor families and onequarter of all black families received EIC benefits in 1988. Nevertheless,
about 70 percent of the EIC population is white and three-quarters are
nonpoor. The typical EIC family has a low-to-moderate income that
places it above the poverty line; EIC benefits may well be the only in
come assistance many of these families receive. We also find that the
EIC population in 1988 appeared to be working relatively long hours
25
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at relatively low wages. Finally, the average credit in 1988 was still
quite low under $500 in our data and not much above that in IRS
tabulations so the contribution of the EIC program to the economic
well-being of low- and moderate-income families was certainly quite
modest.

The EIC Population in 1988
Procedures
Our description of the EIC population in 1988 is based on detailed
information on the income and demographic traits of a nationally
representative sample of about 5,600 nonelderly households taken from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Because the PSID is na
tionally representative and provides extensive demographic and labor
market information about families, it is suitable for drawing a com
posite picture of the EIC population. 2
Before turning to our findings, it is important to understand the limita
tions of the PSID data for this purpose and how we have tried to com
pensate for those problems. First, the PSID does not ask directly about
whether a family receives a credit through the EIC program. 3 It does,
however, include information for each household on the amount of earn
ed income, the amount of adjusted gross income, and whether or not
there are children in the family the three factors that are used to
calculate the credit. Thus, it is possible to determine whether a par
ticular family would have been eligible for EIC and to compute the
amount of credit for which it would be eligible. 4
When we do that for 1984 the most recent year for which the PSID
data were available at the time of this study and compare it to the in
formation published by the IRS on EIC receipt in 1984, we find that
the two sets of estimates are very similar. IRS tabulations show an
average credit of $284 per family (the maximum credit in 1984 was
$500) and a recipient population of just under 5.8 million families, while
the PSID computations yield an average credit of $252 and a recipient
population of about six million families. This suggests that the indirect
EIC calculation that we use is quite accurate and that the PSID yields
an EIC recipient population that is very close to the true EIC population.
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The second problem is not as easy to resolve. Ideally, to describe
the EIC population in 1988, one would use a data set that provided in
formation for a representative national sample of families in 1988. Un
fortunately, because of the time lags associated with collecting and releas
ing survey data, current data are not available. And since the EIC pro
gram changed substantially between 1984 and 1988, a picture of the
EIC population in 1984 would tell us very little about the EIC popula
tion in 1990.
What we do, therefore, is use the 1984 PSID demographic data and
"update" all 1984 income terms to 1988 values using 1984-1988 in
come growth factors from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to create
a "pseudo-1988" PSID data set. The growth factors are disaggregated
by race and by 1984 income on the basis of income quintile points
reported in the 1984 and 1987 CPS. We assumed an increase in nominal
income of 5 percent between 1987 and 1988.
While this is clearly an imperfect procedure, the resulting data ap
pear reasonable. 5 For example, comparing the actual 1984 data and the
pseudo-1988 data, we find that the poverty rate for nonelderly families
fell about 6 percent between 1984 and 1988. That decline is comparable
to the actual change over that time period.
Moreover, the two sets of EIC figures are reasonably close, especially
with allowance for the fact that the reported IRS numbers are estimates.
For 1988, the IRS reported an average credit per person of $527 and
a recipient population of 9.1 million, while the estimate derived from
the PSID for 1988 is $486 with a recipient population of about 10 million
families. While we would certainly prefer to use a genuine 1988 data
set, the updated 1984 data set appears to be a decent approximation.
We do, however, urge reasonable caution in using the estimates. There
is undoubtedly some imprecision created by our procedures.

Findings
Table 2.1 provides summary information on the fraction of families
in various demographic and income categories that were eligible for
the EIC in 1988. Overall, we estimate that about one family in nine
(10.7 percent) received a credit. About one quarter of black families,
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Table 2.1
Proportion of Various Population Subgroups Who Received
Earned Income Credit in 1988
All
Race
White
Black
Poverty status
Poor
Nonpoor
Family income
< $10,000
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
> $30,000
Marital status
Married
Single parent
Age of household head
<Age 25
25-34
35-44
45-64
Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more
Residence
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Large MSA
Small MSA
Non-MSA
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

10.7
8.7
24.1
32.0
8.8
27.3
39.1
13.4
3.7
1.0
13.0
52.0
21.4
12.8
11.6
5.6
0
26.6
20.2
18.9
8.1
11.7
11.9
10.5
11.1
8.8
12.3
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half of single-parent families, and about a third of poor families received
EIC in 1988. So did nearly 9 percent of nonpoor families.
Younger families and families with one child were also more likely
to receive EIC. Differences by region and MS A residence were small,
with families in the Northeast least likely to receive EIC and families
in non-MSAs more likely to receive EIC.
The proportion of families receiving EIC actually rises from the lowest
family income bracket (<$10,000) to the second bracket
($10,000-$15,000), presumably because the first bracket includes a
substantial number of families who fail to meet the earned income re
quirement. Among families with income above $15,000, EIC receipt
falls off sharply; this reflects the income limit for EIC eligibility which
in 1988 was reached at an adjusted gross income of $18,580. Note,
though, that some families with substantial incomes qualify for EIC,
because their adjusted gross income (on which EIC eligibility is based)
is low. 6
The most important numbers in table 2.1 are those for poor and nonpoor families. Two-thirds of all poor, nonelderly families in 1988 were
ineligible for EIC. This should not be surprising: it is a natural conse
quence of the EIC requirements in conjunction with the work status
and demographic status of the poverty population. We find that about
a quarter of all poor, nonelderly families had children, but were in
eligible for EIC because they had no earned income. 7 About another
quarter had earned income but no children, and the remainder had neither
earnings nor children. 8 The restriction of EIC benefits to families with
children excludes over 40 percent of working poor families.
At the same time, a substantial proportion of nonpoor families received
EIC in 1988. Again, there is really nothing surprising about this: it
follows from the relatively low phase-out rate, the fact that credit levels
are not adjusted by family size, and the occasional large differences
between family income and income for tax purposes.
These nonpoor EIC recipients fall into two groups. The first group
has income above the poverty line but under the 1988 EIC income max
imum of $18,580. Since the poverty threshold for a family of four in
1988 was just over $12,000, it was possible to earn substantially more
than the poverty line and still receive a credit. For nonpoor families
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in this group, 28 percent received a credit, just a bit less than for the
percentage for poor families. The other nonpoor group has adjusted
gross income under $18,580, but family income above that. Two per
cent of families with income hi that range were eligible for EIC. It turns
out that they account for a nontrivial portion of the EIC population.
Table 2.2 shows the average income of the EIC population in 1988.
Total family income averaged just under $16,000, adjusted gross in
come was about $10,000, and earned income just under $9000.
Table 2.2
Mean Income of EIC Recipient Families, 1988
Total family income
Adjusted gross income
Earned income

$15,079
10,034
9,810

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Table 2.3 offers a more detailed look at the composition of the EIC
population. Column (1) shows the share of EIC recipients belonging
to various population subgroups, column (2) shows the average credit
received by each group, and column (3) shows the share of total credits
received.
The figures in column (1) reveal that EIC recipients are predominantly
white (70 percent) and nonpoor (72.6 percent). Despite this latter find
ing, three-quarters of EIC families have incomes less than $15,000 (76
percent). At the other extreme, about one EIC family in nine has an
income above $20,000, and some even have incomes above $30,000.
On the whole, though, it appears that the EIC program is providing
benefits primarily to moderate income, nonpoor families, precisely the
group that is often excluded from most income-transfer programs.
A majority of the families have a single parent (about 80 percent of
them are female-headed) and over 80 percent of the families have only
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Table 2.3
EIC Receipt, Average Credit, and Share of Total Credits
by Selected Family Characteristics, 1988 °

All
Race
White
Black
Poverty status
Poor
Nonpoor, income < $18,580
Nonpoor, income > $18, 580
Family income
< $10,000
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
> $30,000
Marital status
Married
Single parent
Age of household head
<Age 25
25-34
35-44
45-64
Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more
Residence
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Large MSA
Small MSA
Non-MSA

Share of
EIC
population
(%)

Average
credit
($)

Share of
total credits
(%)

100.0

486

100.0

70.1
29.9

478
505

69.2
30.8

25.4
62.6
12.0

487
506
382

25.2
64.6
10.3

36.2
40.2
12.8
6.7
4.0

556
476
389
410
396

41.0
38.9
9.2
5.9
3.9

43.5
56.5

482
490

43.0
57.0

18.1
38.0
26.5
17.4

528
464
520
445

19.7
36.3
28.3
15.9

0.0
48.9
33.6
17.5

0
495
472
487

0.0
49.8
32.4
17.2

16.7
30.6
35.1
17.7
17.9
31.5
50.6

508
493
490
446
461
491
492

17.4
31.0
35.4
16.2
17.0
31.8
51.2

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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one or two children. Geographically, the EIC population is predominant
ly composed of rural families (50 percent) and of families in the South
(35 percent).
There is relatively little variation in the size of the average credit
received by each group, so the share of total EIC credits received reflects
primarily each group's share of the EIC population. Thus, almost 70
percent of EIC credits go to white families, three-quarters to nonpoor
families, and over half to families in non-MSAs.
Finally, table 2.3 shows that poor families who were eligible for EIC
received, on average, a credit of $487 in 1988. Their average poverty
gap the difference between their total income and the poverty stan
dard for a family of their size was almost $3,300, so that EIC
eliminated, on average, only 15 percent of the poverty gap. 9 Since EIC
benefits are positively related to earned income for much of the income
range for poor families, it follows that EIC benefits will typically be
negatively related to the poverty gap the larger the gap, the lower the
EIC credit. It is clear that at current funding levels, EIC makes a relative
ly modest contribution to the economic well-being of working poor
families.
Table 2.4 examines the work hours and wage rates of EIC families.
It shows clearly that the head of an EIC household 10 is, most often,
an essentially full-time, year-round worker. Almost 60 percent work
ed at least 1,500 hours a year and almost a quarter reported that they
worked more than 2,080 hours 40 hours a week for 52 weeks. Wives
in EIC families worked considerably less: a bit more than one-third
did not work at all and, of those who did work, two-thirds worked less
than 1,500 hours. But family labor supply husbands and wives
together was substantial by any standard. The average family work
ed almost 1,900 hours a year, with one-third working more than 2,080
and one-eighth more than 3,000 hours.
Not surprisingly, given their considerable work hours and their lowto-moderate incomes, the wage rates of EIC recipients were relatively
low. Approximately 40 percent of household heads and 70 percent of
working wives earned less than $5.00 an hour, while only a quarter
of the family heads and one-seventh of working wives earned as much
as $7.00 an hour. Whatever concern there may have been that the low
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Table 2.4
Work Hours and Wage Rates of EIC Recipients
1988__________ ___
Share of EIC recipients
Work hours - husband or single parent
Did not work
1-500
500-1,500
1,500-2,080
> 2,080
Average3
Work hours - wife
Did not work
1-500
500-1,500
1,500-2,080
>2,080
Average8
Work hours - family
1-500
500-1,500
1,500-2,080
2,080-3,000
>3,000
Average8
Wage rate - husband or single parent
Did not work
<$5.00
$5.00-$7.00
>$7.00
Average
Wage rate - wife
Did not work
<$5.00
$5.00-$7.00
>$7.00
Average
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
a. Includes zeros.

5.1
12.5
25.1
34.6
22.7
1,544
36.6
14.9
27.4
12.6
8.3
715
11.9
22.7
32.4
20.6
12.4
1,879
5.1
41.0
29.0
24.9
$5.89
36.6
43.9
11.0
8.5
$4.31
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earned incomes of EIC recipients reflected relatively low work effort
rather than low wages is clearly allayed by these figures.

Summary
A number of interesting findings emerge from our profile of the 1988
EIC population. We find that the EIC program provides benefits to
roughly one-third of all poor families and one-quarter of all black
families. The EIC population is, however, predominantly white and nonpoor. The typical EIC family has a low-to-moderate income that places
it above the poverty line, and for many of these families, the EIC credit
may well be the only income assistance they receive. We also find that
the EIC population appears to be working relatively long hours at low
wages. Finally, the average credits were quite low, so the contribution
of the EIC program to the economic well-being of low- and moderateincome families is certainly quite modest.
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NOTES
1. In 1988, the maximum credit was $875. The maximum earnings on which the credit could
be received was $6,250 and the stationary range extended to $9,830. The credit was completely
phased out at an adjusted gross income of $18,580. The phase-in and phase-out rates were 14
and 10 percent, exactly as in 1990.
2. The PSID data have been collected annually since 1968 by the University of Michigan's In
stitute for Social Research and have been used in countless research studies of economic wellbeing. Because the PSID oversamples poor families, it provides a larger-than-normal proportion
of EIC-eligible families. The use of sample weights corrects for this oversampling and yields
a representative national sample of the population and of EIC recipients.
3. There is no nationally representative data set that provides both specific information on EIC
receipt and on characteristics of families that receive EIC.
4. We necessarily assume that every eligible family actually receives EIC. The IRS now checks
all returns for EIC eligibility and computes the credit it if is not already claimed. The procedure
we use will overstate receipt if some eligible families do not file tax returns.
5. It is impossible to be definitive here, since no data set containing 1988 information is currently
available. CPS information for 1988 was collected in the spring of 1989 and will not be available
before mid-1990.
6. The high income of some EIC-eligible families appears to reflect two general situations:
(1) substantial income provided by "other family members" who may actually be filing a separate
tax return; and (2) substantial nontaxable transfer income. This finding also appears in the IRS
reports; see Committee on Ways and Means 1989, p. 795.
7. More accurately, there had no earned income in 1984. Since we had no information about
actual employment in 1988, we assumed that individuals did not change their work status be
tween 1984 and 1988.
8. Prior to the 1987 EIC adjustments, it was also possible for a family to be officially poor but
to have an income above the maximum EIC income level and thus be income-ineligible.
9. The comparable figure from the CPS for 1986 is $4,394 for all poor families and $4,766 for
poor families with children. The PSID typically finds higher reported incomes and thus lower
poverty rates and poverty gaps than the CPS.
10. The PSID defines the husband as the head of a married household except in rare circumstances.

3
The Labor Supply Effects
of the EIC
In this chapter, we examine the likely effects of the EIC on the labor
supply (hours of work) of EIC recipients. Labor supply effects are not
only of importance in then- own right a program that reduces selfreliance is clearly a matter of concern but also for accurately predict
ing program costs. 1
That income-transfer programs might affect individual decisions about
how much to work is by now well-understood. The adverse labor supply
effects of the AFDC program and of the Negative Income Tax (NIT)
have been widely studied and are regarded as among the more serious
defects of those programs.
That EIC might also have adverse labor supply effects has not been
as fully appreciated. But since EIC changes both an individual's net
wage and his or her total income, it, too, provides a possible incentive
for an individual to change the number of hours worked.
There are, though, some important and interesting differences be
tween the likely labor supply effects of EIC and those of more conven
tional income transfer programs like AFDC and NIT. First, it is quite
possible that EIC could increase the labor supply of workers in lowincome families, something that can be said for none of the other ma
jor income-transfer programs. And second, while EIC does have some
potential negative labor supply effects, they are primarily confined to
workers in nonpoor families whose labor supply is already substantial.
That, too, would seem to be an attractive difference between EIC and
other income-transfer programs.
We estimate that in 1988 the EIC program reduced the annual hours
EIC recipients worked by at most 2 or 3 percent. The small size of
this effect is largely the result of the relatively modest income amounts
currently offered by the program. Increases in the generosity of the pro
gram, coupled with increases in the phase-out range, would almost cer
tainly lead to larger reductions in labor supply.
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The Effect of EIC on Individual Labor Supply
We begin with a nontechnical discussion of the standard economic
theory of individual labor supply in order to set the stage for evaluating
the impact of EIC. 2 Readers familiar with the theory will want to skip
ahead to the next section. We then turn to the details of the EIC pro
gram and look at its expected labor supply effects. Finally, we use the
labor supply results from the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex
periments (SIME/DIME) to estimate the likely effect of the EIC pro
gram on labor supply in 1988. In chapter 5, we apply the same pro
cedure to a set of alternative EIC plans.
The Economic Theory of Individual Labor Supply
According to the standard economic theory of individual labor sup
ply, each individual chooses the amount of hours he or she wants to
work on the basis of three general considerations: (1) the net wage rate,
which is the amount by which take-home pay would increase with another
hour of work; (2) the amount of nonlabor income; and (3) preferences
for work vs. income. Together, these three factors lead to a "best"
number of hours of work, where "best" means that the value of the
income gained from an additional hour of work just offsets the value
of the leisure that is given up in working that extra hour. No other choice
would be preferred.
For our purposes here, the exact details of this choice are unimpor
tant. What does matter is how this choice is likely to change when there
is a change in the net wage and/or in nonlabor income. That is where
EIC fits in, since, like all income-transfer programs, it does exactly
that it changes an individual's net wage and her nonlabor income.
Before turning to the specifics of EIC and the changes it causes, we
need to develop the general principles. Suppose, first, that an individual's
unearned income increases, but the net wage is unchanged. At the in
dividual's current hours of work, total income (earned plus unearned)
is now obviously higher than before. Both common sense and numerous
research studies suggest that, in the event of a change of this kind, an
individual will typically work a bit less than before. 3 More formally,
economists say that the income effect on labor supply is negative: as
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unearned income goes up, the amount of hours that an individual will
choose to work goes down.
The effect on desired hours of work of an increase in the net wage
is more complicated because two things change simultaneously. First,
the higher net wage means that an individual can now get more income
per hour of leisure given up. If all other things including income
were unchanged, it would make sense to work a bit more. Intuitive
ly, the "price" of leisure measured by the wage rate is higher, and
an individual would tend to "buy" less of it, which, in turn, is equivalent
to working more. This effect captures the pure price effect of a wage
change. It is called the substitution effect, and it causes a change in work
hours that is in the same direction as the change in the wage rate. 4
But other things are not equal, since the wage increase also makes
an individual richer at the current hours of work. For example, a $.50
per hour wage increase for an individual working 40 hours a week makes
that person exactly $20 richer, prior to any changes in labor supply.
This change in income is the second effect and, exactly as in the case
of an increase in unearned income, it will typically cause a decrease
hi work hours.
Note that in the case of an increase in the wage rate, the substitution
and income effects naturally conflict. The higher wage is an incentive
to work more, while the higher income is an incentive to work less.
Whether an individual will work more or less when the wage increases
depends on whether the substitution effect is greater than or less than
the income effect.
This simple analysis is all we need to make predictions about how
changes in the net wage and/or unearned income like those caused
by the EIC program will affect an individual's labor supply choice.
There are two simple "rules":
(1) An increase (decrease) in income with no change in the net
wage will decrease (increase) desired labor supply. This is the in
come effect.
(2) An increase (decrease) in the net wage rate with no change
in income (measured at the original work hours) will increase
(decrease) desired labor supply. This is the substitution effect.
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In order to determine the likely labor supply effects of any change,
simply see which of the above conditions apply and draw the appropriate
conclusion. When these changes happen in isolation, we can always
make a definite prediction. When two changes happen simultaneously,
the result may sometimes be indeterminate, as in the case of an increase
in the wage rate that both increases the net wage and total income. But,
as we will see below in the analysis of the phase-out range of the EIC,
sometimes even when there are simultaneous changes, we can still be
certain of the likely result.

EIC and Labor Supply
We expect EIC to affect individual labor supply choices because it
alters the net wage rate an individual receives as well as his or her total
income. The three ranges of the EIC phase-in, stationary, and phaseout have quite different labor supply effects, though, because the
changes in the net wage and in nonlabor income caused by EIC are
quite different in each range.
Consider, first, a low-wage worker whose household earnings before
any credit place him in the EIC phase-in range (earnings less than $6,250
in 1988). With the EIC, two things happen: first, his net wage is in
creased by 14 percent (the EIC phase-in rate) and, second, at his cur
rent hours of work, his income is exactly 14 percent higher than before.
For example, someone who was earning $4.25 an hour and working
1,250 hours a year without EIC, has, with EIC, a net wage of
$4.85 $4.25 plus a $.60 per hour credit and is $750 richer. 5
Exactly like the case of an increase in the net wage, the effect of these
changes on an individual's labor supply is uncertain. The substitution
effect of the higher net wage provides an incentive to work more hours,
but the income effect of more income at the current hours of work pro
vides the opposite incentive. The incentives conflict, and on the basis
of theory alone we cannot be certain which is stronger. Thus, for workers
on the EIC phase-in range, EIC may increase or decrease labor sup
ply. Although noneconomists often assume that a wage subsidy like EIC
will always provide an incentive to work more, in fact, that is not
necessarily so. There is no guarantee that labor supply will not decrease.
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For an individual whose pre-EIC income puts her in the stationary
range (income between $6,250 and $9,830 in 1988), the expected labor
supply effect of EIC is unambiguous. She would receive a credit of
$875 and, thus, be exactly $875 richer. But her net wage is unchang
ed, since another hour of work does not affect the credit she receives
(unless she is earning exactly $9,830). For her, the EIC operates as
a pure increase in income it is like an increase in unearned income
even though it is related to her work. 6 Thus, in this range, EIC pro
vides an incentive to reduce labor supply via an income effect.
In the phase-out range (income between $9,830 and $18,580 in 1988),
the labor supply prediction is also clear. Here, a worker has a lower
net wage rate than in the absence of EIC, because of the 10 percent
phase-out of the credit. For example, if an individual's net wage without
EIC was $5.50, the net wage with EIC would be only $4.95 that is,
$5.50 - .10 * $5.50 because the credit is reduced by 10 percent for
each additional dollar earned. But despite this cut in the net wage, the
individual is nevertheless richer because of the income received from
the credit. Thus, on the phase-out range, an individual is simultaneously
richer than without EIC and has a lower net wage rate. Both changes
provide incentives to reduce labor supply.
This last result should not be a surprise to those familiar with the
operation of means-tested income support programs it is the standard
result for a program that provides benefits to lower-income workers
and then withdraws the benefits as earnings increase. The benefits make
the individual richer, while the phase-out reduces the net wage. The
simultaneous increase in income and cut in the net wage assures a reduc
tion in labor supply. AFDC and NIT are the classic examples, and,
indeed, the NIT experiments were conducted to provide information
about how large the labor supply reductions might be.
There are several important differences, though, between the labor
supply disincentives of EIC and of a traditional welfare program like
AFDC. First, since the phase-out range in AFDC begins almost with
the first hours of work there is a small "earnings disregard" of $30
per month and an allowance for child care expenses the work disincen
tives are concentrated on low-income workers. In contrast, in the EIC
program, the phase-out range affects workers with much higher incomes
and thus much higher pre-EIC work hours.
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Second, the income increase and the phase-out rate in EIC are both
very low, at least by the standards of other transfer programs. The cur
rent statutory phase-out rate in AFDC is 66 percent (after the $30 a
month "disregard") for the first four months of work, and 100 percent
thereafter. Average annual AFDC benefits per family in 1988 were
$4,400 (Committee on Ways and Means 1989, table 19, p. 557) com
pared to less than $500 per family under EIC. Because of this, the labor
supply effects of EIC will be much less serious than for more conven
tional income-transfer programs.
There is one final group of "workers" for whom the labor supply
incentives of EIC are uniformly positive. They are easily overlooked,
but they may well be important. They are workers who are not work
ing in the absence of EIC. The most likely such group is women receiving
AFDC, and for them, EIC is simply a wage increase, with no offset
ting increase in income. 7 The labor supply effects for this group are
unambiguously positive.
Summarizing:
(1) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the
EIC phase-in range, the effects of EIC on hours of work are uncer
tain. Desired hours of work may increase or decrease.
(2) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the
EIC stationary range, EIC reduces hours of work due to the in
come effect.
(3) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the
EIC phase-out range, EIC reduces hours of work due to both the
substitution effect and the income effect.
(4) For an individual in a household with no earned income in
the absence of EIC, EIC should increase the probability of work.

Evaluating Changes in EIC
Using exactly the same labor supply analysis as above, we can predict
the likely labor supply effects of changes in the EIC program. To assess
any proposed change, simply check whether it would increase or decrease
an individual's net wage and whether it would increase or decrease her
income (measured at her current labor supply).
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To pick a very simple example, suppose the phase-in and phase- out
rates were both increased, but the income levels defining the phase-in,
stationary, and phase-out ranges were kept constant. What would we
expect to happen? For a worker on the phase-in range, the net wage
is now higher, but so is income at the current labor supply, so labor
supply could increase or decrease. On the stationary range, labor supply
will definitely fall, since the credit is now larger and the net wage is
unchanged. Finally, for a worker on the phase-out range, the credit is
larger and the net wage lower, leading to a further reduction in labor
supply.
Some effects, though, are more complex because they result in changes
in the size of the population eligible for EIC. Suppose, as an example
of this, that the phase-out rate was reduced but everything else remain
ed the same. For workers on the phase-in and stationary ranges,
everything is exactly as before so there would be no changes in labor
supply. For workers on the phase-out range, there are conflicting ef
fects. The lower phase-out rate increases their net wage and thus pro
vides a labor supply incentive via the substitution effect. But, at the
same time, they will receive a larger credit than before the credit is
now phased-out more slowly and that generates an income effect that
will reduce desired work. Finally, because the lower phase-out rate raises
the maximum income level at which the credit is received, previously
ineligible higher-income families are now eligible for EIC on the phaseout range. For these new eligibles, there is both a substitution effect,
since the phase-out rate lowers the net wage, and an income effect, since
they now receive a credit; both changes are incentives to reduce hours
worked. Whether the total labor supply effects of this kind of change
are positive or negative depends on the magnitude of the changes for
the current eligibles on the phase-out range and for the new eligibles.
The Labor Supply Effects of the EIC in 1988
The theoretical predictions about the labor supply effects of EIC tell
us, at most, only about its qualitative effects whether labor supply
is expected to increase or decrease. It does not, however, predict whether
those effects are likely to be large or small. In the case of the phase-in
range, where the two labor supply effects conflict, the theory does not
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even yield qualitative predictions. For information on the actual quan
titative effects of EIC, we need to turn to empirical studies of individual
labor supply responses to programs like EIC.
To do that, we use information on income and substitution effects
estimated for low-income workers in the Seattle/Denver Income
Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). We then apply those estimates
to the 1984 PSID data, updated to 1988 values as described in chapter
2. The SIME/DIME research provides estimates of the labor supply
response of husbands, wives, and female heads per dollar of wage change
(the substitution effect) and per $1000 of income change (the income
effect). 8 For each working individual in a PSID family receiving an
EIC credit in 1988, we first calculate the change in their net wage
(relative to no EIC) and the amount of the credit they would receive,
and then use those estimates to compute an expected change in labor
supply. 9
It is important to understand that we are not independently testing
whether EIC causes changes in labor supply. That would be a rather
formidable task that is beyond the scope of this monograph. Rather,
we are assuming that the EIC recipient population reacts to the programinduced changes in the net wage and income in the same way that
SIME/DIME participants reacted to the changes caused by the Negative
Income Tax. Given the rather indirect link between hours of work, earn
ed income, and receipt of the credit via the annual tax filing, it is cer
tainly possible that workers might ignore the EIC effects altogether or
perhaps regard the credit solely as an increase in income. Nevertheless,
we think that treating workers as well-informed and as making pur
poseful decisions about labor supply is useful. It is probably prudent,
though, to think of the estimates below as likely maximum responses
to the current EIC program.
Our estimates are presented in table 3.1, separately for workers in
each of the three EIC ranges, by wage level, and for husbands, wives,
and single heads. 10 The table shows that the labor supply response is
almost certainly quite small at current EIC program values. Averaging
over all groups and ranges, we estimate that in 1988 the EIC program
reduced labor supply of EIC recipients by just over 30 hours a year,
or just over 2 percent of what labor supply would have been in the
absence of an EIC program.
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Table 3.1
Estimated Labor Supply Response to EIC Program, 1988

Change in annual Percentage
work hours
change

Proportion of
EIC recipients

All recipients

-31.2

-2.1

EIC range
Phase-in
Stationary
Phase-out

18.4
-35.1
-51.1

2.2
-2.3
-2.8

25.2
14.6
60.2

Wage rate
<$5.00
$5.00 - $7.00
>$7.00

-17.6
-36.7
-52.7

-1.1
-2.2
-3.6

48.5
27.9
23.6

Marital status
Husbands
Wives
Single parents

-30.4
-41.6
-26.9

-1.6
-3.6
-1.9

31.5
21.9
46.6

100

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Interestingly, for workers on the phase-in range, the estimated labor
supply change is positive. We estimate that annual hours of work in
crease by 18 hours or roughly half a week's work. While this is not
a large change, it is a very encouraging result and one that was uncer
tain a priori. It may well be the first evidence of an income transfer
program with any positive labor supply effects.
Because of the labor supply effect, these workers are actually earn
ing more than they would have in the absence of the program total
earnings increase by more than the credit since labor supply increases.
Since the average wage for these workers is about $4.00 per hour and
their average credit is $390, the estimated labor supply increase means
that the each dollar of credit received by these workers translates into
a $1.18 increase in total income. 11

46

Labor Supply Effects

For workers on the stationary and phase-out range, the estimated labor
supply effects are negative, as expected. The largest negative effects
are for workers on the phase-out range, because both substitution and
income effects cause a decrease in hours and also because the absolute
change in the wage (which determines the magnitude of the substitu
tion effect) is usually large. Using the average wages and credit for
these two groups of workers, the labor supply responses offset approx
imately 20 percent of the credit for workers on the stationary range and
70 percent of the credit for workers on the phase-out range. 12
When we look at workers grouped according to their wage rates a
classification that might approximate a labor market we find that
predicted hours worked fall for all three wage groups. There is a decline
even for low-wage workers, because a majority of low-wage workers
are not in low-income families (i.e., phase-in level incomes). (See table
3.2 for details on the distribution of workers by wage bracket across
the three EIC ranges.) The predicted decline in work hours in about
1 percent for the lowest wage group, 2 percent for workers earning
between $5 and $7 per hour, and over 3.5 percent for the highest-wage
group.
Table 3.2
The Distribution of Workers in EIC-Eligible Families
by Wage Rate and EIC Range, 1988
Wage level

Phase-in

Stationary

Phase-out

<$5.00

40.2

16.8

43.1

$5.00 - $7.00

14.1

13.4

72.5

>$7.00

7.9

11.4

80.7

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Finally, the bottom portion of the table shows the predicted changes
for husbands, wives, and single parents. In both absolute and percent-
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age terms, the labor supply decline is largest for wives. This occurs
both because working wives tend to be in families with income that
puts them on the phase-out range and also because the SIME/DIME
research found that they were most responsive to changes in the net
wage and income.
What do these labor supply changes tell us? First, because EIC in
corporates subsidy and taxation rates that are quite modest relative to
AFDC or the NIT plans, its labor supply effects are small. The 2 per
cent labor supply response we found here is less than one-quarter of
that found for the various NIT plans tested in the SIME/DIME research.
More generous EIC plans with larger subsidy and taxation rates would
be likely to have proportionately larger effects. 13
Second, on both the phase-in and phase-out ranges, the labor supply
response will increase the amount of credit for which a family is eligi
ble. For workers on the phase-in range, the average 18-hour increase
in labor supply would increase the credit received by about $10 (2 per
cent), while the labor supply response of workers on the phase-out range
would increase their credit by about $30 (about 7 percent). 14

Summary
Means-tested income-transfer programs inevitably offer incentives
for individuals to reduce their work hours, and EIC is no exception.
We estimate that in 1988, the EIC program reduced the annual labor
supply of recipients by about 30 hours, just over 2 percent.
There are, however, two features of EIC that are unique and very
attractive. Its most adverse labor supply incentives are concentrated not,
as in most income-transfer programs, on workers with the weakest con
nection to the labor market, but on workers whose income and labor
supply is substantial. Second, for workers in the poorest EIC families
those on the phase-in range the labor supply incentives are mixed, rather
than unambiguously negative. While it is not inevitable that an EICstyle wage subsidy will increase labor supply for workers on the phase-in
range, our empirical estimates suggest that this is, in fact, likely to be
the result.
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Chapter 3 Appendix
The Labor Supply Effects of the EIC Program
Figure 3A. 1 shows a standard diagram for individual labor supply analysis.
Hours of work are measured along the horizontal axis and total income on
the vertical axis. Since the diagram measures work hours, rather than leisure
time, along the axis, the corresponding indifference curves are upward-sloping.
For simplicity, we ignore the effect of taxes and other welfare programs on
budget lines. We also assume that EIC does not result in any change in market
wage rates.
Figure 3A. 1 illustrates the effect of EIC on labor supply for a worker whose
adjusted gross income in 1988 was under $6,250 and who was, therefore, on
the phase-in range of the EIC. In the absence of EIC, the relevant budget line
is OB0; the slope of OB0 is w, the market wage. Optimal labor supply is HQ,
where the indifference curve and budget line are tangent.
Figure 3A.I
Labor Supply Effects of EIC
for a Worker on EIC Phase-In Range
Income
B, (slope = 1.14 w)
B'
B 0 (slope = w)

HO

Hours of Work
H

NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OB, is budget constraint with EIC.
Substitution Effect: HO -*-H'; Income Effect: H' -*-H,; Total Effect: H0 -*-H,
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Figure 3A.2
Labor Supply Effects of EIC for a Worker on EIC Stationary Range
Income

BQ (slope = w)

Hours of Work

0

NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OCBj is budget constraint with EIC.
Income Effect = Total Effect =H0 -*-Hj

Figure 3A.3
Labor Supply Effects of EIC for a Worker on EIC Phase-Out Range
Income

Phase-out
(slope = 0.9 w)

Bi
BQ (slope = w)

H'

Hours of Work

NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OCDBj is budget constraint with EIC.
Substitution Effect: H,, -*-H'; Income Effect: H' -» H,; Total Effect: HQ -*>H,
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In the phase-in range, EIC operates exactly like a conventional 14 percent
wage increase. Thus, the ElC-inclusive budget line pivots upward to OBj,
whose slope is 1.14*w. Using the Slutsky decomposition, the substitution ef
fect is measured along budget line OB7 , which incorporates the wage subsidy
(it is parallel to OBj), but, for labor supply HQ, yields the original income.
Faced with a higher net wage and the same total income (at HQ), an individual
will typically choose to increase labor supply. In the figure, desired labor supply
increases to H7 . This increase from HQ to H7 reflects the substitution effect.
The income effect of the change in the net wage is measured across parallel
budget lines, from OB7 to OBj. The vertical distance between the two budget
lines is precisely the amount of the credit for which the individual is eligible
at current work hours (.14*wH0 in this example). Assuming that leisure is
a normal good, hours of work fall, so that the optimal hours choice along OBj
will lie to the left of H7 (i.e., fewer hours of work). As always, the income
and substitution effects of a wage increase conflict and hours worked may rise
or fall.
Whether or not the choice of desked work hours with EIC involves a decrease
or increase relative to HQ is an empirical issue. Figure 3A. 1 illustrates the
case where the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, so that
the EIC wage subsidy increases work hours.
Figure 3A. 2 provides the corresponding analysis for a worker with family
income between $6,250 and $9,830. The pre-EIC budget line is again denoted
as OB0 and the original hours choice is HQ. With EIC, this worker faces the
kinked budget line OCBp The important point is that, in the neighborhood
of current labor supply, the net wage is unchanged (OB0 and OCBj both have
a slope of w), but total income is exactly $875 higher. The expected result
is a decline in labor supply from HQ to Hj.
Finally, the case of a worker on the EIC phase-out range is shown in figure
3A.3. The two budget lines are OB0 and OCDBj, and this time, in the rele
vant range, the EIC-inclusive budget line is both higher and flatter. The substitu
tion effect, measured along B7 , causes a reduction in labor supply to H7 . Here,
unlike the case of a worker on the phase-in range, the income effect also causes
a reduction in labor supply. Labor supply, under EIC, is shown as Hj.
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NOTES
1. In the EIC program, most of the likely changes in labor supply increase the amount of credit
that an individual is eligible to receive and thus increase the cost of the program.
2. A more technical analysis is given in the appendix to this chapter.
3. Intuitively, the individual "spends" some of the increase in total income on more leisure. Taking
more leisure is equivalent to working fewer hours.
4. The substitution effect is measured under the hypothetical situation in which the wage changes
and there is at the same time a perfectly offsetting change in nonlabor income, leaving the in
dividual neither richer nor poorer at the current hours worked.
5. $.60 is 14 percent of $4.25. $750 equals $.60 per hour times 1,250 hours.
6. It is, however, unrelated to her hours of work at her current hours of work.
7. Technically, they are no richer at their current labor supply choice of hours.
8. We use Robins' (1985) summary of estimated income and substitution effect parameters for
the SIME/DIME research. The substitution effects, measured as the expected change in annual
work hours per dollar change in the wage, are -47, -85, and -75 for husbands, wives, and female
heads, respectively. The corresponding income effects, per $1,000 increase in income, are -36,
-47, and -50.
9. Our estimate is AHi =bs*AWi +bj*AIi, where i indexes individuals, b$and bj are the
SIME/DIME estimated substitution and income effect parameters, respectively, AH is the predicted
change in annual hours worked, AW is the change in the net wage due to EIC, and AI is the
change in income at current labor supply and is equal to the credit received. Our approach is
partial-equilibrium; we assume that the program does not change market wages. Given the cur
rent operation of the program, this is probably a reasonable assumption, but if EIC were substan
tially expanded, one might expect the labor supply effects to be large enough to change market
wage rates.
10. For the small number of single men heading EIC families, we used the SIME/DIME labor
supply response estimates for single female heads.
11. The 1.18 figure is the increase in credit plus earned income ($72) divided by the credit alone.
12. The average wages for the two groups are $5.00 and $6.00, respectively. Average credits
are $874 for the stationary-range workers and $430 for those in the phase-out range.
13. See chapter 5 for further details.
14. For workers on the phase-in range, $10 is 14 percent of the additional $72 of earned income
(18 hours x $4.00/hour). For workers on the phase-out range, $30 is 10 percent of the predicted
$300 decrease in earnings (51 hours x $6.00/hour).

4
Comparisons with Other
Antipoverty Policies
This chapter compares the Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) with four
antipoverty policies: a negative income tax, welfare (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children), an increase in the minimum wage, and a
wage subsidy.
Negative Income Tax
More than two decades ago, it was proposed that the tax system be
used to provide cash benefits to low-income households. Instead of mak
ing a net payment to the Internal Revenue Service, a low-income
household would receive a net payment from the IRS. The proposal
was called a Negative Income Tax (NIT) because the household would
receive cash from, rather than pay cash to, the IRS; and the amount
would depend on its income. But an EIC also uses the tax system to
make cash payments to low-income households. So how does an EIC
differ from an NIT?
There are two crucial differences between the EIC schedule and the
NIT schedule. Recall from chapter 1 the two distinguishing features
of an EIC, illustrated here in figure 4.1. First, if a household has no
earnings, it receives no credit, so the EIC is clearly restricted to work
ing households. Second, the EIC begins with a phase-in range where
the credit rises as the household's labor earnings rise.
As can be seen in figure 4.2, the NIT differs from the EIC in these
two crucial features. If a household has no earnings, it receives the max
imum credit Cm, so the NIT gives its largest credit to nonworking
households. Hence, the NIT does not have a phase-in range. It may
begin with a stationary range, as drawn in figure 4.2, or may simply
begin with its phase-out range. Most proposed NIT plans have a small
stationary range to cover work- related expenses.
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Figure 4.1
EIC Schedule

Figure 4.2
NIT Schedule
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There is a simple relationship between the EIC diagram (figure 4.1)
and the NIT diagram (figure 4.2). In figure 4.1, imagine moving the
vertical axis to the right so it goes through point Em (so Em =0) and
then erasing everything to the left of Em. The result would be figure
4.2, the NIT diagram. So the NIT is an EIC that omits the phase-in
range. 1
What would be the impact of an NIT on labor supply? The answer
was given in chapter 3 where we analyzed the impact of an EIC on
labor supply; just skip the section on the phase-in range. Just as an EIC
should reduce labor supply for households in the stationary or phaseout ranges, so would an NIT.

Welfare
Both an EIC and an NIT use the tax system to assist low-income
households. Welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC)
does not use the tax system. Yet welfare is similar to the NIT, and dif
fers from the EIC, in the key feature of its schedule: the maximum benefit
goes to the household with zero earnings, so there is no phase-in range.
This feature largely reflects the historical origins of AFDC, which was
included in the original Social Security Act as a way to provide assistance
primarily to young widows and their children in a time when labor force
participation of women with young children was not expected.
Since welfare and an NIT share this fundamental feature, how do
they differ? First, an NIT would apply to all households with income
below the designated standard. By contrast, AFDC largely confines
assistance to single parents with children. 2 An NIT would therefore
remove the incentive to become or remain a single parent in order to
obtain benefits. Second, an NIT would provide cash only, and would
neither impose work requirements nor offer social work services.
Whether an NIT is preferable to welfare can be debated. For our pur
pose, the key point is not the difference between an NIT and welfare,
but the key property they share in contrast to the EIC: the NIT and
welfare provide the maximum benefit to the household with zero earn
ings, while the EIC provides zero benefit; the NIT and welfare lack
a phase-in range, a key feature of the EIC.

56

Comparison with Other Programs

Minimum Wage Law
The minimum wage has two serious shortcomings in comparison with
an EIC. First, raising the minimum wage reduces employment and
generates involuntary unemployment. Second, many of the beneficiaries
of minimum wage legislation live in relatively affluent households.
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of a minimum wage law. The legal
minimum wage w* exceeds the market wage w0 determined by sup
ply and demand. The rise in the wage to w* reduces the total hours
of labor that firms find profitable, so total hours are reduced from H0
to H*. Workers whose hours are not reduced gain from the minimum
wage law. Workers who remain employed but have hours reduced may
gain or lose. Workers who are laid off or never find a job in the first
place clearly lose.

Figure 4.3
Minimum Wage Impact

H (Hours)
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By contrast, as we explained in chapter 3, an EIC may raise or lower
labor supply (depending on whether the phase-in or phase-out ranges
dominate), but at the market wage that results, labor demand equals
labor supply, so the EIC does not generate involuntary unemployment.
Many of the workers who benefit from raising the minimum wage
are relatively affluent. One recent study (Burkhauser and Finegan 1989),
using data from the Current Population Survey, estimated that if the
minimum wage were raised from $3.35 to $5.05, only about 10 per
cent of the increased wage bill would go to low-wage workers who live
in households below the poverty line, while nearly 40 percent would
go to low-wage workers whose household income was at least three
times the poverty line. Previous research (Gramlich 1976; Johnson and
Browning 1983) also provides evidence of the weak relationship be
tween low-wage workers and low-income families.
The minimum wage law, however, has two political advantages over
the EIC. First, the EIC has a visible budgetary cost, while the minimum
wage does not. Second, the EIC reduces the cost of low-skilled workers
to firms, while the minimum wage raises the cost. High-wage firms
that compete with low-wage firms prefer the minimum wage to EIC
because it reduces competition from low-wage firms.
It should be recognized, however, that the minimum wage imposes
both an invisible budgetary cost and a genuine loss on the economy.
Workers who are laid off because of the minimum wage may qualify
for unemployment compensation. Workers who simply do not find a
job may qualify for welfare. Yet the public may not recognize that these
budgetary costs are due to the minimum wage.
More important, the output of the economy is reduced by the minimum
wage. Output varies directly with hours of labor. Since the minimum
wage reduces total hours of work, it reduces national output. Moreover,
the reduction in hours is involuntary. At the minimum wage w* in figure
4.3, workers want to supply more hours than firms demand. So the
workers whose hours are reduced, or who are laid off, clearly do not
prefer the enforced "leisure" to the lost income. Thus, the minimum
wage imposes a genuine loss on the economy.
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Wage Subsidy
A wage subsidy (WS) would pay an individual a fraction of the gap
between his wage and some target wage. For example, an individual
might receive a credit equal to 50 percent of the gap between his wage
and $7. 3 The larger the gap (the lower the individual's wage), the larger
would be the wage subsidy. If the individual's wage were $4, his credit
per hour would be $1.50 (50 percent of the $3 gap); if his wage were
$5, his credit per hour would be $1.00 (50 percent of the $2 gap).
A central distinction between a wage subsidy and the earned income
credit is that a WS is based on the individual's wage, while the EIC
is based on the household's total income. If the WS applied to all lowwage individuals, it would be subject to the same criticism as the
minimum wage law: its benefits would be poorly targeted. As we just
documented in our discussion of the minimum wage law, there is only
a weak relationship between low-wage workers and low-income families.
This targeting problem can be significantly reduced by placing eligibili
ty restrictions on the WS. For example, one advocate has suggested
that the subsidy be limited to the principal earner in a household (the
individual who earned the most money during the previous calender
quarter) with dependent children. 4 This would prevent subsidy from
going to nonpoor teenagers, or second earners whose primary earner
has a high wage.
Nevertheless, under a wage subsidy, households with very different
incomes might receive the same benefits. For example, suppose that
the principal earner in households A and B each earn $5 per hour, but
household A has a second earner who also earns $5 per hour, while
household B does not. Household A has twice the income of household
B, yet would receive the same total wage subsidy. Moreover, the wage
subsidy would remain equal even if household A also had significant
property income while B has none.
It would be possible, of course, to introduce further restrictions bas
ed on household income into the wage subsidy program. For example,
limits on household property income might be imposed. But the result
would be a hybrid subsidy, based partly on the individual's wage and
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partly on the household's total income, that might be difficult to under
stand and still be beset with unintended anomalies.
The advantage of the EIC is that it is based on household total in
come. Simply and automatically, the EIC takes account of multiple
earners and income sources.
Besides targeting, there are two other key differences between a WS
and an EIC. First, the WS credit depends exclusively on the wage rate,
while the EIC credit depends on total earnings which are the product
of the wage and the number of hours worked. Second, the WS phases
out over its entire range; whenever the wage increases towards $7, the
credit per hour is cut. By contrast, the EIC begins with a phase-in range,
and may have a stationary range before its phase-out begins. What are
the consequences of these two differences?
In our analysis of the EIC, we saw that a phase-out imposes a positive
marginal tax rate (MTR). For example, the current EIC phase-out rate
of 10 percent imposes an MTR of 10 percent because an additional $100
of earnings results in a net gain of only $90 (since the credit is cut $10).
Hence, earning more by either raising hours worked or obtaining a
higher wage is discouraged in the EIC phase-out range.
The reverse occurs in the EIC phase-in range. We saw that the phase-in
imposes a "negative" MTR. For example, the current EIC phase-in
rate of 14 percent imposes an MTR of -14 percent because an addi
tional $100 of earnings results in a net gain of $114. Hence, earning
more by either raising hours worked or obtaining a higher wage is
encouraged in the EIC phase-in range.
Under a WS, the credit depends on the wage, not hours worked. So
working more hours never provokes a phase-out, and is never discourag
ed. On the other hand, since the WS phases out over its entire range,
working harder or better in order to earn a higher wage is always
discouraged. In the above example, suppose a worker earns a wage in
crease from $4 to $5 per hour. His net gain per hour is only $.50, not
$1, because his credit per hour is cut from $1.50 to $1. His income
per hour (wage plus credit) rises only from $5.50 to $6. Thus, this par
ticular wage subsidy imposes a 50 percent MTR on wage increases.
Thus, a WS never discourages more hours of work, while an EIC
discourages more hours in its phase-out range. But a WS always
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discourages effort to earn a higher wage, while an EIC encourages such
effort in its phase-in range.
Finally, there is a serious practical problem with the wage subsidy:
measuring work hours accurately. Suppose an employer and employee
agree on annual compensation of $10,000. Although the employee is
actually required to work 2,000 hours, implying a wage of $5, the
employer and employee agree to report a wage of $4 and hours of 2,500.
Under the above WS example, a wage of $4 would obtain a WS credit
per hour of $1.50; multiplied by 2,500 hours, the annual credit would
be $3,750. If they had reported a wage of $5, the credit per hour would
have been only $1; multiplied by 2,000 hours, the annual credit would
have been only $2,000. Thus, by understating the wage and overstating
hours worked, the employee gains $1,750 of annual credit while the
employer's compensation remains $10,000.
Because it would be difficult for auditors to determine actual hours
worked, especially in small firms, many employers and employees might
be tempted to engage in such distortion. Monitoring wages and hours
is more difficult than monitoring their product earnings.
NOTES
1. The algebra of the NIT schedule is the same as the algebra of the EIC schedule (given in the
appendix to chapter 1) with the phase-in omitted:
C=C^

C=0
ifEs>EpC .
To obtain E , set C=0 in the second equation and solve for E:

In its phase-out range, the NIT imposes a marginal tax rate (MTR) of pQ. In the special case
where the NIT phase-out begins immediately, ^=0, and Ee =(Cm/p0).
2. Married-couple families with low incomes are eligible for assistance in some states through
the AFDC-UP program, but eligibility has been restrictive and participation very low. The Fami
ly Support Act of 1988 requires all states to offer the AFDC-UP program.
3. Robert Lerman, "Nonwelfare Approaches to Helping the Poor," Focus 11,1 (Spring 1988).
4. Robert Lerman, "Nonwelfare Approaches to Helping the Poor," Focus 11,1 (Spring 1988).
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Options and Effects

The overall picture of EIC that emerges from the previous chapters
is of a program that operates quite successfully, although still on a
relatively small scale. EIC is well-designed and it appears to operate
efficiently. Its negative impact on individual work behavior is very small
relative to other income-transfer programs. It has clear and significant
advantages compared to alternative income-support programs such as
minimum wage legislation, a wage-subsidy plan, and conventional
welfare.
In its present form, however, EIC makes no more than a modest con
tribution to the well-being of low-to-moderate income families. The max
imum credit received in 1988 was only $875 and the average credit
actually received by an eligible family was $527. l (The small impact
on labor supply and the small average credit received are not, of course,
unrelated.) As we have emphasized several times, this average annual
credit is not very much more than the average monthly income available
to nonworking families in the AFDC program. Many families with a
full-time worker at the minimum wage are still left far below the poverty
line, even after the credit.
As part of the growing disenchantment with conventional welfare pro
grams like AFDC and an increasing concern with the well-being of the
working poor, numerous proposals to expand the EIC program have
been developed in the past few years. Virtually all legislative programs
to address the problems of poverty and welfare dependency now prom
inently include an expanded role for EIC. David Ell wood, one of the
leading academic experts on the welfare system and the author of Poor
Support, has proposed a sharp increase in the EIC subsidy rate as part
of his overall welfare reform package. A proposal to adjust EIC benefits
by family size was endorsed by the highly-publicized 1989 Ford Foun
dation Report, The Common Good: Social Welfare and the American
Future.
...
ol
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Proposals to expand EIC often appear in the body of other legisla
tion as the mechanism by which income-related and/or child-related
transfers are made. In the 101st Congress, both the Senate and the House
of Representatives considered and ultimately approved major child-care
bills that featured an expansion of the EIC program. In the House of
Representatives, the Early Childhood Education and Development Act
would make two major changes in the program by adjusting benefits
by family size and also according to the age of children. 2 The Act for
Better Child Care Services, passed by the Senate, would also adjust
the EIC credit rate by family size, but only for families with children
under age four. For families with older children, the provisions of the
EIC program would be unchanged. 3 As of this writing, the two bills
were to be considered by a House-Senate Conference Committee.
In this chapter, we look at a variety of possible changes in, and ex
pansions of, the EIC program, including variations in phase-in and phaseout rates, adjustments for family size, changes in the maximum income
on which the credit is computed, and expansion of the program to poor
families without children. We begin by identifying the basic trade-offs
that are inherent in attempts to revise EIC. We then consider a set of
specific EIC alternatives and estimate the likely impacts of these alter
natives if they had been in effect in 1988. As in chapters 2 and 3, we
draw our estimates from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics.
Revising EIC: Basic Issues and Problems
Most proposals for reform of EIC involve an increase in the credit
rate and/or adjustments in benefit levels for family size. The logic of
both changes is easy to appreciate. An across-the-board increase in EIC
would help make full-time low-wage work more attractive relative to
welfare. In conjunction with an increase in the minimum wage, it might
also enable many low-income families to escape from poverty. 4 It is
argued that family size adjustments are warranted because the maximum
credit now offered is a declining fraction of the poverty standard for
larger families. Relative to their needs, EIC provides less assistance
to larger families. 5
The arithmetic behind these arguments is presented in table 5.1. Col
umn (1) shows the official 1988 poverty threshold for families ranging

Table 5.1
Low-Wage Work, EIC, and Poverty Status in 1988

Family
size

Poverty
threshold8

Year-round
full-time earnings
+ EICb

Credit as fraction
of poverty threshold
(%)

Post-transfer income
(% of poverty threshold)

2

$ 7,701

$9,375

11.3

122

3

9,428

9,375

9.3

99

4

12,008

9,375

7.3

78

5

14,301

9,375

6.1

66

a. Estimated Poverty Thresholds, Committee on Ways and Means 1989, p. 941.
b. Assumes 2,000 hours at wage rate of $4.25.
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from two to five persons; the total income for a family with a full-time
low-wage worker (defined here as 2000 hours at $4.25 per hour) plus
the maximum credit of $875 is given in column (2). The table shows
that, as a proportion of the poverty threshold, the maximum credit falls
almost in half as family size increases from over 11 percent for a family
of two to about 6 percent for a family of five. Families with two or
more children remain well under the poverty threshold. 6
The figures in the table also illustrate how just large EIC credit rates
must be in order to bring larger families with low-wage workers up
to the poverty threshold. Even if the credit were applied to the entire
earned income of these hypothetical families (rather than just the first
$6,250), the required credit rate would have to be 41 percent for a family
of four and 68 percent for a family of five. These credit rates are roughly
three and five times the current 14 percent rate. If, instead, the credit
were calculated on only the first $6,250 of earnings, the necessary credit
rates would be 56 and 93 percent, respectively. 7
Issues in EIC Design
Expansion of EIC runs into many of the well-known conundrums that
have plagued other income transfer programs, especially AFDC. While
none are fatal, there are clearly trade-offs that must be recognized.
To aid in the discussion, figure 5.1 shows the 1988 EIC schedule
and identifies the parameters of the schedule. Cm is the maximum credit
($875), which was received at earnings between Em and E^ ($6,250
and $9,830 respectively in 1988). The phase-in and phase-out rates 14
and 10 percent, respectively are reflected by the slopes of the lines.
The income at which the credit is completely phased-out is Ee ($18,580
in 1988).
Consider, first, what would happen if there were an increase in the
phase-in rate in order to assist low-income working families. If no other
EIC parameters are changed, the higher phase-in rate means that the
maximum earnings at which the credit can be received and thus the
size of the EIC-eligible population will also rise. For example, a dou
bling of the EIC phase-in rate to 28 percent would extend eligibility
to families with earnings up to $27,330, up from $18,580. 8 Thus, not
only will poorer families now receive larger credits, but so would
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nonpoor families on the phase-out range, as well as yet higher-income
families who were previously ineligible. As a result, a previously in
eligible family with an income of $22,500 would now be eligible to
receive a credit of $483. The costs of the program thus increase substan
tially, in large part because of the increased benefits to nonpoor and
previously ineligible families.
Figure 5.1
EIC Schedule 1988

$875

$6,250

$9,830

$18,580

The tempting solution to this problem is to increase the phase-out
range to offset the increase in the phase-in rate. In this example, a dou
bling of the phase-out rate to 20 percent is sufficient to maintain the
maximum income for eligibility at its current level. 9 But while this solves
one problem, it creates another: families on the phase-out range now
face labor supply disincentives that are much more serious than before
the two changes were imposed. Their net wage falls it is now only
80 percent of the market wage 10 but their total income (measured at
their current work hours) increases because the credit they receive
increases.
As was explained in chapter 3, this combination provides a dual in
centive for these workers to reduce their work hours. There is also an
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increased work disincentive via the income effect for workers in families
on the stationary range, since their credit is now larger, too. It is not
even clear that workers on the phase-in range will work more as a result
of the larger subsidy, since they face conflicting income and substitu
tion effects: their net wage is higher, but so is their income.
There is no simple solution to this problem. If EIC benefits to lowerincome families are to be increased, then either increased benefits will
go to higher-income families and EIC expenditures will increase substan
tially or else moderate-income families will face increased labor supp
ly disincentives. 11 Below we provide some quantitative information on
the magnitude of the trade-offs.
EIC includes two additional program parameters that can be varied
in any revision the maximum earnings on which the credit is calculated
(Em) and the earnings at which the phase-out of the credit begins (Ej,).
Increasing either (or both) extends the size of the EIC-eligible popula
tion by increasing the maximum income (Eg) at which a credit can be
received. An increase in E,, increases this maximum income dollar for
dollar, while an increase in Em increases it by the ratio of p{ to p0. With
the current phase-in and phase-out rates, this means that each $1 in
crease in Em increases the maximum income cutoff by $1.40. 12
To see clearly the effects of changes in these parameters, consider
a proposal to increase Em from its current $6,250 to, say, $7,500, with
no change in Ej, or in the phase-in or phase-out rates. This would pro
duce a higher credit ($175 more) for all EIC families with earnings above
$6,250 and would push the income limit for eligibility up to $20,330. 13
Work hours for this group would probably fall slightly they are richer
at their current hours of work and their net wage is unchanged. For
the poorest group of EIC workers those with incomes below
$6,250 the increase in Em would have no effect on either income or
labor supply.
Raising Ej, alone would provide no additional benefits for workers
hi families on the phase-in and stationary ranges. It would increase the
credit only for workers in families on the phase-out range that is, the
higher-income EIC families and would therefore provide an increas
ed work disincentive via the income effect. It would also increase the
maximum income limit for EIC eligibility.
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Family Size Adjustments
Table 5.1 showed that maximum EIC benefits ranged from 11.3 per
cent of the poverty threshold for a family of two to 6.1 percent for a
family of five. Table 5.2 shows two different ways that the maximum
credit could be adjusted in order to provide benefits to all families equal
to the 11.3 percent of the poverty threshold that EIC now provides for
a family of two. 14 Column (3) shows how such a credit would vary
with family size; it ranges from the current $875 for a family of two
to $1,623 for a family of five. In column (4), we show the necessary
EIC phase-in rates, assuming that the maximum income on which the
credit is applied does not vary by family size. The rates start at the cur
rent 14 percent and then rise at between 3 and 5 percentage points per
additional family member, reaching 26 percent for a family of five.
Column (5) shows how to accomplish the same thing in a different way
by varying the maximum income on which the credit can be earned
rather than the credit rate. Again, there is substantial variation by family
size.
Table 5.2
Alternative EIC Family Size Adjustments

a.
b.
c.
d.

Family
size

Poverty
threshold8

Maximum
creditb

Phase-in
ratec

Earnings
threshold (Em)

2

$ 7,701

$ 875

14.0%

$ 6,250

3

9,428

1,070

17.1

7,643

4

12,008

1,363

21.8

9,736

5

14,301

1,623

26.0

11,593

Estimated, 1988.
Maximum credit set equal to 11.3 percent of poverty threshold.
Assumes earnings threshold for credit equals $6,250.
Assumes credit rate of 14 percent.
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If EIC benefits are adjusted for family size, consideration may also
be given to the idea of extending eligibility to families without children.
In 1988, about 40 percent of working poor households (about one-quarter
of all poor households) were ineligible for EIC because they did not
have children. 15 Since the poverty threshold for these smaller families
is substantially less than for larger families, lower benefits would cer
tainly be appropriate.

Revising EIC: Plans and Findings
In this section, we first describe a set of specific revisions of EIC,
and then estimate the likely impact of each using the PSID data. The
plans we consider are listed in table 5.3; the top half includes the EIC
as it actually was in 1988 plus three variations that do not include familysize adjustments, while the bottom half includes four plans with various
adjustments for family size. Because the official poverty index is bas
ed on family size, we make adjustments on that basis rather than in
terms of the number of children.
Plan IA in table 5.3 is the 1988 EIC law, with a phase-in rate of 14
percent, phase-out rate of 10 percent, and a stationary range running
from $6,250 to $9,830. We include it in all the analyses to provide a
frame of reference. In IB, both the phase-in and phase-out rates are
doubled, but the stationary range is unchanged. The maximum credit
doubles, but the income limit for eligibility remains unchanged at
$18,580. 1C also incorporates a doubling of the phase-in rate, but the
phase-out rate is kept at 10 percent. As a result, while the maximum
credit for plan 1C is identical to IB, the income eligibility level is substan
tially higher. Finally, in ID the phase-in rate is kept at the current 14
percent, but the earnings on which the credit is computed is increased
by 50 percent to $9,375, and the phase-out rate is also increased by
50 percent to 15 percent. Together, these changes yield a maximum
credit of $1,313 (a 50 percent increase), while keeping the size of the
eligible population unchanged.
In the bottom half of the table, plan IIA applies the current EIC
parameters to single parents with one child and then increases the credit
rate by 4 percentage points for each additional family member through
the fourth in single parent families and the fifth in married-couple
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families. The resulting phase-in rates 14, 18, 22, and 26 percentare very similar to those that table 5.2 showed would, when applied
to the 1988 income threshold of $6,250, produce a maximum credit
that was a constant proportion of the poverty rate for families from two
to five persons. This change would increase the maximum credit by
$250 per person and the maximum income for EIC eligibility by $2,500
per person (up to the specified family size limits). Thus, as the table
shows, a family of five or more would be eligible for EIC benefits up
to an income of $26,100 in 1988.
HE uses the same phase-in rates as in HA, but it adjusts the phaseout rate for each family size so as to maintain the current income eligibili
ty limit. Thus, in this version, a family of three would face a phase-in
rate of 18 percent and a phase-out rate of 12.9 percent, while a family
of four would have phase-in and phase-out rates of 22 and 15.7 per
cent, respectively. 16 EC is identical to IIA in all respects, except that
it extends eligibility to married-couple families without children, with
a credit rate of 12 percent. Finally, IID keeps the credit rate at 14 per
cent for all families, but increases the income threshold used to com
pute the credit by about $1,800 per person. With these thresholds, the
maximum credit by family size is exactly the same as those in HA. Note,
though, that the maximum income for eligibility is slightly higher for
larger families than in HA. 17
Of the plans considered here, IIB is closest to the EIC expansion in
cluded in the child-care bill passed by the House of Representatives.
The phase-in rates used in IIB are uniformly three points lower than
in the House bill except for married couples with three children, where
the rates are a point higher, and the phase-out rates considered here
are slightly lower than in the House bill. 18 In both cases, however, the
phase-in rate is designed so that it is 1.4 times the phase-out rate
exactly the ratio in the 1990 law so that the resulting maximum in
come threshold for eligibility is the same in both plans. 19 The major
difference between Plan IIB and the House version is that IIB does not
include the supplemental "young child" credit, and thus is less generous.
Our estimates of the impact of all of the plans are presented in table
5.4. The procedures used are exactly the same as those used in chapter
2 to generate the descriptive information about the 1988 EIC popula-

Table 5.3
Summary of Alternative EIC Plan Characteristics

Plan

Income threshold
for maximum
Phase-in
credit
rate
($)
(%)

No family size adjustment
IA
IB
1C
ID
Family size adjustment
DA
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children )
Married, 1 child j
Single, 3+ children )
Married, 2 children /
Married, 3+ children
IIB
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children)
Married, 1 child )

Maximum
credit
($)

Income
Income
threshold
Phase-out
threshold
for eligibility
rate
for phase-out
(%)
($)
($)

14
28
28
14

6,250
6,250
6,250
9,375

875
1,750
1,750
1,313

9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830

10
20
10
15

18,580
18,580
27,330
18,580

14

6,250

875

9,830

10

18,580

18

6,250

1,125

9,830

10

21,080

22

6,250

1,375

9,830

10

23,580

26

6,250

1,625

9,830

10

26,100

14

6,250

8.75

9,830

10

18,580

18

6,250

1,125

9,830

12.9

18,580

w

Single, 3 + children )
Married, 2 children /
Married, 3+ children

22

6,250

1,375

9,830

15.7

18,580

26

6,250

1,625

9,830

18.6

18,580

12
14

6,250
6,250

750
875

9,830
9,830

10
10

17,350
18,580

18

6,250

1,125

9,830

10

21,080

22

6,250

1,375

9,830

10

23,580

26

6,250

1,625

9,830

10

26,100

14

6,250

875

9,830

10

18,580

14

8,036

1,125

9,830

10

21,080

14

9,830

1,375

10,330

10

24,070

14

11,610

1,625

12,110

10

28,350

nc
Married, no child
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children ^
Married, 1 child J
Single, 3 4- children )
Married, 2 children f
Married, 3+ children

no
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children )
Married, 1 child /
Single, 3+ children )
Married, 2 children f
Married, 3+ children

2?<

£2.
cro
W
0

Table 5.4
Simulation Results for Alternative EIC Plans8

Share of total credits
received by

2!
(TO
W

Poor
families
(%)

Families with
income
< $15,000
(%)

Recipients
(%)

Aggregate
(%)

80.8
80.8
63.4
81.5

-2.1
-4.2
-3.2
-2.5

-.20
-.40
-.55
-.25

72.3
80.6
70.7
69.2

-2.6
-2.8
-2.5
-2.6

-.34
-.27
-.39
-.35

% families
eligible

Average
credit
($)

IA
IB
1C
ID

10.7
10.7
17.4
10.7

486
973
919
650

11.6
17.8
7.8

25.4
25.4
17.0
22.1

HA

13.6
10.7
16.2
14.0

631
640
600
595

9.6
7.6
10.8
9.3

22.2
26.9
21.2
18.8

Plan

nB
nc
no

Total
costb
($)
5.8b

Labor supply effect

a. See table 5.3 for characteristics of plans.
b. Total cost for 1988 EIC from Committee on Ways and Means, 1989, p. 793, table 12. Total cost for other plans computed relative to 1988 costs.
Estimated costs do not incorporate labor supply adjustments.
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tion and in chapter 3 to estimate labor supply effects. The table shows
the fraction of families that would be eligible for EIC, the average credit
that would be received, and the share of total EIC credits received by
poor families and by families with income less than $15,000. There
are also two labor supply estimates, one for recipients only and a sec
ond for the economy as a whole. The latter measure is especially useful
for comparing plans in which the size of the eligible population dif
fers. All of the findings pertain to 1988; they show what the effects
of each variation would have been if they had been in effect in 1988.
The figures in the first row (IA) are for the actual 1988 EIC law.
The total cost $5.8 billion is the IRS estimate (Committee on Ways
and Means 1989, p.793); all of the other figures are from PSID tabula
tions. 20 Most of the numbers in the first row have been presented earlier;
the last entry shows that the 1988 EIC probably reduced total labor supply
in the economy by about 0.2 percent. This reflects both the coverage
of the EIC in 1988 and its average effect among recipients.
Plan IB, in which the phase-in and phase-out rates are doubled, pro
duces an average credit, total cost, and labor supply reduction that are
exactly twice as high as IA, while leaving the composition of the reci
pient population unchanged. 21
1C is the most expensive alternative considered. Its 28 percent phase-in
rate and 10 percent phase-out rate result in an average credit of $919
and almost a doubling of the size of the EIC- eligible population, up
to 17.4 percent. It is more than three times as expensive as the 1988
law and more than $6 billion more than IB.
Relative to IB, the additional costs in this plan reflect the higher credits
received by families on the phase-out range and the substantial increase
in the income limit for eligibility; families on the phase-in and stationary
ranges receive exactly the same credit in both plans. This compositional
change can be seen as well in the sharp fall in the share of total credits
received by poor families and low-to-middle income families in this plan.
The possible attractiveness of a plan like 1C can be seen in the nextto-last column. While its adverse effect on the labor supply of recipients
is larger than in the current EIC, it is not as large as for plan IB. At
the same time, though, its aggregate labor supply effect is larger than
both LA and IB because the size of the recipient population is so large. 22
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This comparison illustrates the trade-off between individual and ag
gregate labor supply effects: changes that improve the former very often
worsen the latter.
Finally, ID (raising the income level for computing the credit by 50
percent and the phase-out rate from 10 to 15 percent) is the least ex
pensive of the plans that do not involve any family size adjustment.
It provides a somewhat smaller share of credits to poor families for
whom the expansion of the income level is less valuable. Because it
is more generous on average than the 1988 law, it does cause a further
reduction in labor supply, but the effect is quite small.
The four family-size-related plans in the bottom half of the table are,
in some ways, quite similar to one another. All are more generous than
the 1988 law, but there is little difference among them: average credits
range from a low of $595 (ED) to a high of $640 (HB). The predicted
individual labor supply effects are also quite similar, running about 25
percent higher than in the 1988 EIC. The estimated total cost in 1988
ranges from a low of $7.8b for IIB, which has the smallest eligible
population, to $10.8b for EC, which has the largest eligible population.
Aggregate labor supply effects differ somewhat more because of dif
ferences in the size of the covered population. In this respect, EC, which
provides the broadest coverage, is the worst with an aggregate effect
nearly twice as large as the 1988 law. With the exception of plan IIB,
where coverage is the same as in LA, all of these plans involve aggregate
labor supply effects that are substantial compared to the current law.
Even so, the labor supply effects of these plans still seem relatively
small. The estimated effects are less than 3 percent for recipients and
less than 0.4 percent when measured on an aggregate basis.
Our estimates suggest that none of the family-size-adjusted plans in
volve shockingly large cost increases. We estimate that the least generous
version (IIB, which increases phase-out rates along with phase-in rates)
would cost about $1.8b more than the 1988 EIC law and the most
generous (IIC, which does not raise phase-out rates and also includes
married-couple families without children) would cost about $5b more.
Comparing HA and EC, it appears that expansion to married-couple
families without children is relatively inexpensive; we estimate a
marginal cost of about $1.2b. 23
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In terms of targeting credits on poorer families, nB is clearly the best.
Indeed, it is very similar in this regard to the 1988 law, while all of
the other family-size-related plans are much worse. This latter finding
reflects the higher phase-in rates and low phase-out rate that are used
in all of the plans except HE. 24
Finally, the comparison of IIA and IID plans that offer the same
maximum credit in different ways is interesting. We find that the two
plans would have very similar effects. IIA has a higher average credit,
but ED has a larger eligible population, so the total costs are very close
to one another. Predicted labor supply effects are identical. The one
difference, which we have seen before, is that a plan like IID, that in
creases the income on which the credit is based, provides relatively less
to poorer families than a plan like IIA, that increases credit rates.
Table 5.5 provides some additional details about the distribution of
benefits under Plans HA-IID. For each of the plans and for the 1988
EIC, the table shows the estimated average credit and the fraction of
the EIC-eligible population by family size, marital status, and race.
Under the 1988 law, the pattern of credits by family size has an unex
pected U-shaped pattern the largest average benefits go to two per
son families and those with five or more persons. Since the 1988 law
did not adjust benefits for family size in any way, this can only reflect
the relationship between family income and family size. 25 The higher
credits for the smallest and largest families reflect family incomes that
place them relatively near the stationary range where the maximum credit
is received. This shows up clearly in the PSID data: average earned
income by family size is $8,557 for two person families, $10140 for
three person families, $10,973 for four person families, and $9,757
for families with five or more persons.
Without exception and not surprisingly, families of three or more per
sons do fare better under these plans than under the 1988 law. The in
creases range from about 30 percentfor families of three to more than
60 percent for families for five or more. Still, the relationship between
family size and family income has a major impact on the way the four
family-size-adjusted plans perform. Despite the uniform family-size ad
justments built into the formulas, the average credit does not, in fact,
increase smoothly with family size. For three of the plans, the average

Table 5.5
Population Characteristics and Average Credit Received
EIC Plans with Alternative Family Size Adjustments
IA
% of EIC
population
Characteristic
All
Family size
Two persons
Three persons
Four persons
Five or more
Marital status
Married with
children
Married, no
children
Single parent,
with children
Race
White
Black

IIA
Avg.
credit

% of EIC
population

nc

IIB
Avg.
credit

% of EIC Avg.
population credit

% of EIC
population

1ID
Avg.
credit

% of EIC
population

Avg.
credit

100

486

100

631

100

640

100

600

100

595

27.9
41.2
18.9
12.0

504
487
435
520

22.1
37.2
24.7
16.0

504
633
622
814

27.9
41.2
18.9
12.0

504
626
685
934

34.7
31.2
20.7
13.4

474
633
622
814

21.4
36.0
23.8
18.8

504
594
580
717

43.5

482

52.5

670

43.5

723

44.0

670

54.1

632

-

16.2

439

-

--

~
56.5

489

47.5

587

56.5

577

39.8

587

45.9

551

70.1
29.9

478
505

72.9
29.1

621
657

70.1
29.9

637
649

75.4
24.6

585
644

73.4
26.6

590
606

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE: See table 5.3 for characteristics of plans.
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credit actually falls as family size rises from three to four, and it then
rises very sharply for families of five or more.
The different plans also yield population distributions that are quite
different. IA and HB (which are identical in terms of composition) in
clude far fewer large families than any of the other plans. EC, which
includes childless married-couple families, is as a result much more
heavily composed of small families; it is also apparent that its lower
average credit is entirely due to the inclusion of these families.
The plans with higher income eligibility (EA, EC, and ED) have EIC
populations that are more heavily composed of married-couple families,
since those families typically have higher average incomes. Compared
to the 1988 law, the relative proportions of married- vs. single-parent
families in HA. and ED are almost exactly reversed, and EC has an even
higher proportion of married-couple families.
Finally, race differences across the plans appear to be relatively small.
Average credits for black families are consistently higher than for white
families, but the difference is relatively small 2 to 10 percent and
it does not vary much across the plans. Extension of eligibility to childless
married-couple families appears to benefit white families much more
than black families. When that change is made (plan EC), the propor
tion of the EIC population that is white rises from 70 to 75 percent.

Summary
In this chapter we have explored a series of revisions and extensions
of the 1988 EIC law. In its current form, EIC provides benefits that
are large enough to bring a family of three persons with a full-time lowwage worker almost up to the poverty threshold, but larger families
are left far below that level. Since the maximum credit takes no ac
count of family size, EIC benefits are necessarily a much smaller frac
tion of the poverty threshold for larger families.
EIC can be revised along a number of dimensions. Family-size ad
justments and/or across-the-board increases are especially emphasized
in recent legislative proposals. While these increases may be warranted,
we note that they introduce in a more serious form some of the labor
supply, coverage, and cost problems that have plagued other incometransfer programs.
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In the last part of the chapter, we took a close look at a serious of
specific EIC alternatives. The alternatives encompassed increases in
phase-in and phase-out rates, increases in coverage, and a variety of
adjustments for family size. All of the plans we considered were more
generous than the 1988 EIC, and all involved estimated labor supply
effects that were, as a result, more negative than the 1988 law. Estimated
increases in costs ranged from about $2.Ob to over $12b. We estimate
that adjustments for family size, along the lines of a number of recent
EIC proposals, would cost about $4 billion to $5 billion more than the
1988 EIC plan.
NOTES
1. See chapter 2 for further details on the distribution of EIC benefits in 1988.
2. Effective in 1991, the EIC phase-in rate would be increased to 17 percent for a family with
one child, to 21 percent for a family with two children, and to 25 percent for a family with three
or more children, with associated phase-out rates of 12, IS, and 18 percent. In addition, a sup
plemental "young child" credit of 6 percent would be available to families with a child under
the age of six; the supplemental credit would be phased-out at a rate of 4.25 percent. Thus, a
family of three or more with two young children would have a combined phase-in rate of 31 per
cent and a combined phase-out rate of 22.25 percent. With this pattern of phase-in and phase-out
rates, the maximum income for eligibility is about $21,000 in all cases; this is essentially un
changed from what the maximum would be for 1991 with the current EIC law.
3. The credit rates would be 21 percent for families with one child under age four and 24 percent
for families with two or more children under age four.
4. As we have emphasized earlier, an increase in EIC is almost certainly a substitute for and
preferable to an increase in the minimum wage. Recent proposals often recognize this substitutability
by linking more modest increases in the minimum wage to increases in EIC.
5. The uniform treatment of families of different size presumably reflects the initial concern with
offsetting payroll taxes for low-wage workers.
6. The poverty gap for this family of four is $2,634. For a family of five persons, the poverty
gap is $4,927.
7. For a family of four with an earned income of $8,500, the pre-EIC poverty gap is $3,508;
for a family of five, it is $5,801. The EIC credit rates in the text, applied either to $8,500 or
$6,250, yield these amounts.
8. The new maximum earnings is easy to calculate. The EIC benefit formula is C=pjEm - pQ
(AGI-Eu), where AGI is adjusted gross income, p; is the phase-in rate, p is the phase-out rate,
and the other terms are as defined in the text. Setting the credit equal to 0 and solving for AGI
(Ee in figure 5.1), we have Ee =Eb +(p/p0)Em. For ^=$9,830, Em =$6,250, P0 =.10, and
Pj = .28, the maximum adjusted gross income at which the credit can be received is $27,330.
9. The expression for Eg in footnote 8 shows that if E^ and Em are unchanged, Eg is unchanged
as long as the ratio of PJ to p0 is constant. Thus, if both p; and p0 are doubled (or halved, etc.),
the cut-off point for eligibility will be unchanged.
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10. We are continuing to ignore positive taxes. Including federal income taxes, the net wage would
be only 65 percent of the market wage.
11. This problem has been debated repeatedly in the context of the design of AFDC. High benefit
reduction rates limit the size of the eligible population, but generate strong labor supply disincen
tives for those who are eligible. Low benefit reduction rates improve labor supply incentives,
but expand the pool of eligible families. Historically, the program began with high rates and low
eligibility, moved to lower rates and increased eligibility, and then in the 1980s returned to something
very close to the original configuration.
12. Again, this is clear from the expression for Ee in footnote 8.
13. From footnote 8, the formula for the maximum income at which the credit can be received
is Ee =Eb +(p/p0)Em. For Em =$7,500, ^=$9,830, Pj=.14, and P0 =.10, the maximum ad
justed gross income at which the credit can be received is $20,330.
14. There is nothing magical about the 11.3 percent figure. We use it here because it is the highest
percentage given to a family under the 1988 law.
15. If the thrust of EIC is to help poor working families, then there is no particularly compelling
reason to exclude families without children.
16. With these changes, the ratio of phase-in to phase-out rate is the same regardless of family
size. Thus, as seen earlier, the maximum income threshold will be the same for each family size.
17. This happens because the income used to compute the credit is higher than the current phaseout income threshold for the larger families. The stationary range is set equal to $500 for these
families.
18. Note that Iffi bases its credits on family size rather than number of children, as in the House bill.
19. The 1.4:1 ratio holds strictly in OB and approximately in the House bill. The two plans would
have virtually identical thresholds if both were applied to 1991. The income maximums for IIB
in table 5.3 refer to 1988.
20. The average credit amounts shown are from the PSID and are about 9 percent lower than
those reported by the IRS.
21. The labor supply doubling reflects the linear nature of the response estimates in the SIME/DIME
research.
22. These labor supply comparisons require some additional clarification. For workers on the
phase-in and stationary ranges, the labor supply effects of IB and 1C are identical, since the credit
they receive and net wage rate are the same. For workers on the phase-out range, 1C provides
a larger credit and a higher net wage, both by virtue of the lower phase-out rate. This leads to
conflicting income and substitution effects, so that the net effect for them is uncertain. For the
newly-eligible workers in 1C, predicted labor supply falls unambiguously, but the change is relatively
small since the dollar amounts involved are small. The decline in the average labor supply effect
per recipient is, therefore, primarily the result of extending coverage to workers with lower-thanaverage responses.
23. The two plans are identical except for this provision.
24. It may be inappropriate to use a fixed dollar figure ($15,000) to evaluate a plan that is based
on differences in poverty thresholds by family size. It might be better to consider the fraction
of benefits received by families with an income that is less than, say, one-and-a-half times the
poverty threshold.
25. If income were unrelated to family size, the average credit would not vary by family size.

6
How to Increase the EIC
Participation Rate
In this chapter, we address a central practical problem for the Earn
ed Income Credit: How to raise the participation rate for households
entitled to EIC credit. Thanks to an IRS checking procedure, households
that file a tax return are almost certain to receive any EIC credit to which
they are entitled, even if they neglect to claim the credit. The more
serious participation problem involves households that do not file a tax
return.
Households that file a return are alerted to the EIC. At the bottom
of page 1 of both the 1989 1040 tax return and the simplified 1040A
return, it states:
This is your adjusted gross income. If this line is less than
$19,340 and a child lived with you, see "Earned Income
Credit."
Page 2 of both the tax returns contains the line, "Earned income
credit." Surprisingly, this line is not in the Credits section of the return
but in the Payments section where it is added to taxes withheld, so the
taxpayer may well be confused about what the EIC is. 1 However, if
the taxpayer consults the instruction booklet, he will find how to com
pute his EIC using the EIC table. We suggest shifting the EIC to the
credits section of the return so that its meaning is clearer. Claiming
the EIC has not simply been left to the taxpayer. Even if a household
neglects to claim its EIC credit, it is IRS policy to check each filed tax
return for EIC eligibility and grant the credit if the household is enti
tled to it. Because of this important IRS policy, households that file
returns should get any EIC credit to which they are entitled, although
some may not understand why they received the credit.
81
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The Problem of Nonfilers
But what of the household that does not file a tax return? An impor
tant achievement of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the exempting
of many low-income households from the income tax by significantly
raising the personal exemption and standard deduction. For example,
in 1990 a family of four with income less than $13,650 would not owe
any tax. But an ironic by-product of this attempt to help low-income
households is that many may not receive the EIC credit to which they
are entitled because they do not file a return. The 1040 instruction booklet
encourages low-income households to file in order to obtain the EIC,
but many nonfilers probably never check the 1040 instruction booklet.
In our judgment, the most important way to reach potential nonfilers
is through their employers. The IRS currently tries to use employers
to alert these households. The Internal Revenue Service's Circular E,
the Employer's Tax Guide, is the tax instructions booklet for employers.
The section entitled "Advance Payment of the Earned Income Credit"
states:
You are required to notify employees not having income
tax withheld that they may be eligible for a tax refund because
of the EIC. This is because the amount of EIC that exceeds
tax liability is refunded. However, you will not have to notify
employees claiming exemption from withholding on Form
W-4.
Which employees can claim exemption from withholding on Form
W-4? The Employer's Tax Guide says:
Exemption from income tax withholding for eligible per
sons. An employee may claim to be exempt from income
tax withholding because he or she had no income tax liabili
ty last year and expects none this year.
Surprisingly, then, the employer does not have to notify many
employees who most need to be reached. Clearly, the employer should
be required to notify these employees. The EIC section continues:
You can notify your employees by giving them Notice 797,
Notice of a Possible Federal Tax Refund Due to the Earned
Income Credit (EIC).
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Should the Advance Payment System Be Terminated?
How can employers be made more effective in distributing the EIC
notice? One obstacle may be that the employer must currently accept
the administrative burden of providing advance payments of the earn
ed income tax credit. In fact, the section of the Employer's Tax Guide
on the EIC begins:
Employees eligible for the earned income credit (EIC) may
either receive it on their tax returns on in advance payments
during the year. Those who want it in advance must file Form
W-5 with you.
The employer must then follow several single-spaced columns of in
structions on how to administer advance payments. It is possible that
some employers, especially in smaller business firms, will regard the
advance payment system of EIC as a burden worth avoiding. The
simplest way to avoid the burden is to fail to inform one's employees
about the EIC, so there is no chance they will request advance payments.
How does the advance payment system work? Interested employees
can file a W-5 form ("Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Cer
tificate") with the employer. The W-5 form asks the employee whether
he/she expects household adjusted gross income to be less than $20,264
(in 1990). If the employee answers "yes" to both questions, then the
employee can receive advance payments of EIC.
The advance payments are a kind of negative withholding. The
Employer's Tax Guide instructs the employer how to make these
payments.
Figuring the Advance EIC Payment. You must include
the advance EIC payment with wages paid to eligible
employees who have filed Form W-5. . . . Figure the amount
of the payment to include in eligible employees' wage
payments by using the tables ....
Generally, employers will pay the amount of the advance
EIC payment from withheld income taxes and social securi
ty taxes. ... If for any payroll period the advance EIC
payments are more than the withheld income tax and social
security taxes, you may (a) reduce each advance EIC pay-
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ment proportionately, or (b) elect to make full payment of
the advance EIC amount and have these full amounts treated
as an advance payment of the employer's tax liability.
On the W-5 form, the employee must indicate whether his/her spouse
is obtaining advance EIC payments. If so, then the employer uses a
table that results in a smaller advance EIC payment for that employee.
The vehicle for implementing the EIC advance payment is the
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return.
While the current advance payment option strives for the ambitious
goal of including the EIC credit with each pay check, in practice it has
hardly been utilized (only 10,000 out of 6.3 million families in 1986)
so most households receive their EIC payment once a year from the
IRS. Nevertheless, it is possible that an important fraction of employers
may refrain from notifying their employees about the EIC in order to
avoid a possible request for advance payment.
Even if the advance payments option did not deter employers from
publicizing the existence of the EIC, the advance payment system runs
counter to a central feature of the EIC: basing assistance on total
household income. An employer can have accurate information only
on the compensation he pays to one household member. He cannot know
the earnings of other household members, or whether the household
earns property income. Thus, it is quite possible that a household would
obtain more EIC advance payment credits than its annual income would
justify.
Such a low-income household would then be required to return the
excess to the IRS. In practice, however, this household may find it ex
tremely difficult to return the excess. Moreover, the household may
have misunderstood the advance payment, assuming incorrectly that it
need never be repaid. What penalty would the IRS levy on a household
that does not return the excess?
Of course, the intent of the advance payment system is understan
dable: to speed payment to low-earning households that need assistance
and are entitled to it under the EIC program. But this benefit must be
balanced against two costs: employers may resist notifying employees
about the EIC to avoid the burden of administering advance payments,
and advance payment may burden some households with unexpected
required repayment or punishment.
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In light of these considerations, we recommend that serious considera
tion be given to terminating the advance payment system. Its termina
tion will affect only a very small fraction of EIC recipients (0.2 per
cent in 1986). But it may significantly increase the willingness of
employers to publicize the EIC to employees, thereby raising the EIC
participation rate.
If the advance payment system were terminated, then the instructions
to employers concerning the EIC could be greatly simplified. In place
of the current detailed advance payment instructions, the Employer's
Tax Guide might contain just one paragraph. In addition, this paragraph
and notice 797 could be mailed out annually in the first quarter of each
year. The paragraph would read:
You are required to distribute notice 797 to each employee
every January. Notice 797 informs the employee about the
Earned Income Credit, a credit on the personal income tax.
You have no other obligation concerning the EIC except to
distribute a copy of this notice to every employee.
NOTE
1. Of course, the current method does give the correct amount still owed by the taxpayer. By
inclusion in the Payments section, the EIC is treated as though it were tax already paid, just as
taxes withheld are taxes already paid. By this treatment, the EIC does reduce the amount still
owed by the taxpayer by the correct amount. But it would be clearer to include the EIC in the
Credits section, so that it would be seen as a credit from the government to the household due
to the household's labor earnings.

REFERENCES
Burkhauser, Richard and T. Aldrich Finegan. "The Minimum Wage and The
Poor: The End of a Relationship.'' Journal ofPolicy Analysis and Manage
ment 8 (Winter 1989): 53-71.
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. Background
Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means (1990 edition).
The Common Good: Social Welfare and The American Future. New York:
The Ford Foundation, 1989.
Ellwood, David T. Poor Support. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
Gramlich, Edward S. "Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employ
ment, and Family Income." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring
1976): 409-51.
Hendrickson, Susan E. and Isabel V. Sahill. "Assisting the Working Poor."
Discussion paper. The Urban Institute, 1989.
Johnson, William R. and Edgar K. Browning. "The Distributional and
Efficiency Effects of Increasing the Minimum Wage: A Simulation."
American Economic Review 73 (March 1983): 204-11.
Murray, Charles. Losing Ground. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
Robins, Philip K. "A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four
Negative Income Tax Experiments." The Journal of Human Resources 20
(Fall 1985): 567-82.
Steuerle, C. Eugene. "Tax Credits for Workers and Children." Journal of
Economic Perspectives, forthcoming.
_____ and Paul Willson. "The Earned Income Tax Credit." Focus 10,1
(Spring 1987).
Wilson, William J. The Truly Disadvantaged. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1987.

87

Index

Act for Better Child Care Services (1990), S.5, 4-5, 62
Adjusted gross income (AGI): as factor in earned income of, 14-16, 26; of recipients, 30; when
equal to or different from earnings, 22
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDQ, 2; adverse effect on labor supply of, 37, 41;
compared to Negative Income Tax (NIT), 55; criticism of, 61, 79ril 1; effect of income from,
23n5; eligibility for, 2, 60n2; phase-in/phase out range for, 41-42
Antipoverty policy: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as, 55; comparison of
Earned Income Tax Credit program with, 53; Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) as, 7, 8, 21
Browning, Edgar K., 57
Burkhauser, Richard, 57
Capital income, 15, 16
Child care, 2-3
Child-care legislation (proposed), 1, 2-5, 8, 17, 62; See also Act for Better Child Care Services
(1990), S.5; Early Childhood Education and Development Act (1990), H. R.3
Children as criterion for eligibility, 17, 26, 29
Committee on Ways and Means, U. S. House of Representatives, 23n6, 35n6, 42, 73
Current Population Survey (CPS), 27
Data sources: Current Population Survey (CPS), 57; Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
26-27, 35n2, 44, 62
Early Childhood Education and Development Act (1990), H. R.3, 4-5, 8, 62, 69
Earned income: adjusted gross income factor in, 14-16, 26; basis of credit program for household,
2, 7, 26, 29, 58-59; as eligibility criterion, 29-30; estimates of effect of changes in, 64-66,
78n8; phase-in, phase-out and stationary threshholds for,9-15; wage rates for credit recipients,
32-34
Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC): adjusted gross income effect on, 14-16, 26, 30; alternative
plans for, 68-77; defined, 1-3; effect on labor supply of, 37-38,40-42,44, 47-50, 61; eligibility
for, 2, 17, 23n5, 27, 29-30, 64-65; employer role in providing information for, 82-85; estimated
effect of family size adjustments, 67-68, 77; function in determining marginal tax rate, 11-14,
59; incentive and disincentive in, 15, 37, 40-42, 65-66; interpretations of, 3-4; maximum
credit/benefit of, 2, 8, 35nl, 61, 62, 64, 67-68; phase-in, phase-out and stationary ranges
for, 9-16, 18, 41-42, 59-60,64; proposed expansion andreform of, 1, 2-5, 8, 17, 61-77; quan
titative effects of, 44-47; recipients of credit from, 25-34; refundable tax credit of, 2, 7, 18, 21
Ellwood, David, 61
Family Support Act (1988), 1, 60n2
Finegan, T. Aldrich, 57
Ford Foundation Report, 61
Gramlich, Edward S., 57

89

90
Hours of work: in economic theory of labor supply, 38, 48; estimated effect of earned income credit
program on, 37, 45-46; measuring with wage subsidy of, 60
Households, low-income. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); Income transfer;
Minimum wage; Poverty threshhold; Wage subsidy
Income, earned. See Earned income
Income effect. See Labor supply
Income tax, 7, 8
Income tax system: interaction with Earned Income Tax Credit program, 9-14; use by NIT and
EIC for, 55
Income transfer: differences in programs for, 37; earned income credit as, 1-2; incentives in
programs for, 47, 61
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 17-18, 21, 35n4, 81-82; Employer's Tax Guide, Circular E,
82-85
Johnson, William R., 57
Labor earnings. See Earned income
Labor supply: economic theory of individual, 38-40, 48; effect of AFDC and Negative Income Tax
on, 37; effect of differences in incentives and disincentives for, 41-42; effects of Earned In
come Tax Credit on, 37-38, 40-42, 44, 47-50, 61; income effect in theory of, 38-39, 40,
46; substitution effect in theory of, 39, 40, 46, 51nn4, 8
Legislation, proposed: with provision for earned income credit, 1, 2-5, 8, 17, 62
Lerman, Robert, 60nn3, 4
Marginal tax rate (MTR): determinants of, 11-14; for EIC recipient, 11, 59; in negative income
tax program, 60nl
Minimum wage: comparison of earned income credit program with, 2-3,56-57; earned income credit
as complement or substitute, 3-4; effect of, 56-57, 61
Murray, Charles, 1
Negative income tax (NIT): adverse effect on labor supply of, 37,41; as antipoverty policy, 53-55;
compared to AFDC and EIC, 53, 55; stationary and phase-out range of, 53, 54
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 26-27, 35n2, 44, 62
Payroll tax, Social Security: Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) as offset for, 1, 8; offset for, 1
Positive tax system. See Income tax system
Poverty: rate of, 1, 27
Poverty gap, 32, 78nn6, 7
Poverty index, official, 68
Poverty policy, 1-3; See also Antipoverty policy
Poverty threshhold, 25, 29-30, 61, 62-64, 67-68
Robins, Philip K., 51n8
Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME), 38
Social Security Act, 55
Social Security payroll tax. See Payroll tax, Social Security
Substitution effect. See Labor supply

91
Tax Reform Act (1986); phase-in/phase-out threshhold under, 11, 18
Unemployment, involuntary, 2
Wages. See Minimum wage; Wage subsidy
Wage subsidy (WS): comparison with Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) of, 58-60; of earned income
credit for low-wage workers, 2, 4, 7, 21, 25-26, 32, 34, 45, 47, 61; incentives and disincen
tives for, 59-60; proposed changes in eligibility for, 58-59
Welfare. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
Wilson, William Julius, 1

